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The Same-Sex Marriage Prohibition: 
Religious Morality, Social Science, and the 
Establishment Clause 
Céline Abramschmitt* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The issue addressed is narrowly focused on whether the states 
that prohibit same-sex marriage within their respective jurisdictions 
properly separate the interests of church and state so as to pass Con-
stitutional muster under current Establishment Clause jurisprudence.1  
The development of marriage laws in the United States is deeply 
rooted in Judeo-Christian ideals.2  It is this history that prompts the 
question whether the laws prohibiting same-sex marriage are constitu-
tional, or whether such laws violate the separation of church and state 
by endorsing and promoting the Judeo-Christian ideals that are at 
their foundation.  In other words, the question is whether the reason 
for the prohibition of same-sex marriage continues to lie in the fact 
                                                                                                                           
 * J.D., 2007, Florida International University; M.S.W., 2000, Barry University; Managing 
Editor of FIU Law Review for 2006 – 2007.  Thanks are extended to Professor Howard M. Was-
serman, my advisor on this project, for his guidance and input; Professor Thomas E. Baker, for 
his assistance in helping me narrow and focus this topic; and Professor Matthew C. Mirow, Pro-
fessor Heather Lauren Hughes, and Professor José M. Gabilondo, for their thoughtful assistance 
in providing articles of interest and input on the issue.  Thanks are also extended to Jan Stone, 
Law Librarian, for her ideas, criticisms, and helpful assistance.  But, most of all, gratitude goes to 
my beloved wife, Dea Abramschmitt, whose love and support are constant fuel to the realization 
of my fullest potential.  
1 Whether the states should, or would, recognize foreign or out-of-state same-sex marriages 
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV § 1, is not within the scope of this 
Comment.  Nor are domestic partnerships, since they are not considered to be the same as mar-
riage and arguably present a “separate but equal” issue – which could be another paper in its 
entirety.  See In re Coordination Proceeding, Special Title Rule 1550(c), No. 4365, 2005 WL 
583129 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 14, 2005) (consolidating six marriage cases, the Court stated that 
“[t]he idea of marriage-like rights without marriage is adequate smacks of a concept long re-
jected by the courts: separate but equal”); and, more recently, In re Marriage Cases, S147999 
(Cal. Sup. Ct., May 15, 2008) (in this most recent grounds breaking case, the Supreme Court of 
California declares marriage statute banning same-sex marriages unconstitutional, in part, on 
grounds use of separate designation of “domestic partnership” to grant same-sex couples mar-
riage-like rights violates equal protection principles). 
 2 See infra section II-A. 
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that Judeo-Christianity does not approve of same-sex marriage.  Or, 
whether the states have established valid secular reasons for prohibit-
ing same-sex marriage and, therefore, are not violating the separation 
of church and state since a valid secular purpose does not endorse any 
particular religion, but rather serves a valid governmental purpose.   
Whether the states’ various bases for prohibiting same-sex mar-
riage are valid secular bases3 is examined in part through the lens of 
social science scholarship, which addresses social issues and human 
behavior, such as psychology and sociology.  The social sciences focus 
on evaluating and understanding human behavior and social function-
ing.  This scholarly insight can prove helpful in evaluating the validity 
of legal assumptions that underlie the various bases used to justify 
prohibiting same-sex marriage.  Other questions arise such as whether 
the roots of marriage being Judeo-Christian in origin implies that any 
aspect of marriage legislation is an endorsement of Judeo-Christian 
ideology; and, whether the absence of a valid secular basis automati-
cally implies an endorsement of religious ideals by the government.  
These preliminary questions are addressed in the text as well. 
First, the history of marriage in the United States as Judeo-
Christian in origin is established: Older case law exemplifies the im-
pact of marriage’s Judeo-Christian origins once had on judicial deci-
sions.  More recent cases, however, show the continued impact of Ju-
deo-Christian ideology in decisions that support the prohibition of 
same-sex marriage.  This is followed by a discussion on whether the 
prohibition of same-sex marriage violates the United States Constitu-
tion’s Establishment Clause, which states “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exer-
cise thereof. . . .”4  A discussion of current Establishment Clause juri-
sprudence in the United States in regard to the separation of church 
and state follows. 
An enumeration of the various bases used by the states to justify 
and defend a same-sex marriage prohibition is included.  Each of the 
‘secular bases’ for prohibiting same-sex marriage is examined indivi-
dually, starting with a summary of the rationale for the basis provided 
in the statutes and case law.  This is followed by a discussion of the 
scholarship in the fields dealing with human behavior and social func-
tioning which reviews arguments for and against each basis, and in-
cludes an analysis of the validity of the basis as a non-religious secular 
legislative ground for the prohibition of same-sex marriage.  A com-
                                                                                                                           
 3 “Secular basis” is used to denote a basis that is neither bound by, nor attached to, reli-
gious rule. 
 4 U.S. CONST. amend. I.   
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mentary on same-sex marriage and the Establishment Clause ensues, 
followed by a discussion on moralist philosophy and a conclusion. 
II.  HISTORY OF MARRIAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 
A.  Marriage and the Ecclesiastical Law 
A study of the roots of marriage in the United States reveals an 
institution that is thickly clothed in Judeo-Christian ideals.  Marriage, 
as defined in the common law, has its origins in canon law and passed 
to the United States through the early settlers.5  That the origin of 
marriage in this country is rooted in Christian ideals can be seen in 
early case law, where courts openly endorsed the institution of mar-
riage as a Christian institution.  In 1840, for example,6 the Supreme 
Court of Maine issued the Opinion of the Justices to address which 
political branch held the power to grant divorces.7  In their answer, the 
Justices stated “[m]arriage is usually and justly regarded in Christen-
dom as an institution of divine origin, and regulated to a certain extent, 
by the divine command.”8  The Justices stated that the Legislature may 
regulate the institution “in all those numerous incidents wherein the 
divine law is silent.”9  “Divine law,” that is, as seen in a Judeo-Christian 
perspective.  The implication of the court in this 1840 case is that di-
vine law, as defined by Christianity, is the primary source for defining 
marriage. 
Similarly, in a case that addressed the validity of a non-
solemnized marriage in 1905, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma noted 
in its decision that 
[t]he history of the law of marriage in this country traces its 
origins back to the ancient canon law, which consisted of the 
decrees of the various Popes and was the basis of the ma-
trimonial law in England, and has been recognized there 
ever since the establishment of Christianity in the year 605.10   
This expressly recognized that marriage in the United States was orig-
inally defined by the canon law.  And, since the canon laws “were a 
part of the common law of England, and were brought to this country 
                                                                                                                           
 5 See infra notes 7-20 and accompanying text. 
 6 For more examples of courts recognizing and acknowledging the origins of marriage 
from Canon Law, see Reaves v. Reaves, 82 P. 490, 494 (Okla. Terr. 1905); Rosengarten v. Downes, 
802 A. 2d 170, 177-78 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Public Health, No. 
20011647A, 2002 WL 1299135, at *4 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2002).  
 7 In re Opinion of the Justices, 1840 WL 2770, at *1.  
 8 Id. (emphasis added). 
 9 Id. (emphasis added). 
 10 Reaves, 82 P. at 494. 
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by our ancestors, then it must follow that these laws have become, and 
are now, a part of the laws of [the states].”11   
The canon law was founded on biblical principles12 and on the 
customs of the Catholic Church, “which was always recognized as a 
source of law and which down to the end of the 18th century was the 
constituent element of the Common Law.”13  England, which incorpo-
rated the canon law into their Common Law, effectively made Chris-
tianity the law of the land.14  Not only did English common law prin-
ciples incorporate ecclesiastical law,15 another name used to refer to 
the canon law, but also the issue of who may marry was generally left 
to ecclesiastical courts.16  Since the canon law and the ecclesiastical 
courts defined marriage as a monogamous relationship being between 
one man and one woman with gender specific responsibilities, includ-
ing the bearing of children, same-sex marriage was effectively ex-
cluded by definition.17  
Since history shows that courts in the United States once recog-
nized canon law as an authoritative source for defining marriage,18 
judicial decisions regarding marriage were affected and at times dri-
ven by Judeo-Christian moral values,19 as is shown in the discussion 
above.  More recently, not only have legislators expressed their reli-
gious beliefs that same-sex marriage is against Judeo-Christian tradi-
tion, they have even voted in favor of a prohibition of same-sex mar-
riage at the federal level based on such beliefs.20   
                                                                                                                           
 11 Id. 
 12 Ramon v. Ramon, 34 N.Y.S. 2d 100, 108 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1942). 
 13 Id. (citing, SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (1938)). 
 14 Id. (citing, NEW INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, Vol. IV, 2nd Ed. (1917)).  
 15 Goodridge, 14 Mass. L. Rptr. at ---, 2002 WL 1299135, at *4. 
 16 Rosengarten v. Downes, 802 A. 2d 170, 177-78 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002) (citing 1 W. 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 543 (5th Ed. 1773)). 
 17 Goodridge, 14 Mass. L. Rptr. at ---, 2002 WL 1299135, at *4. 
 18 See supra notes 7-16 and accompanying text.  For further discussion on the influence of 
religion on marriage in the United States, see Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Unavoidable Influence of 
Religion Upon the Law of Marriage, 23 QLR 493 (2004). 
 19 The term “moral values” refers to ‘principles of right and wrong that drive the standard 
of behavior.’ 
 20 Alec Walen, The “Defense of Marriage Act” and Authoritarian Morality, 5 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 619, 628 (1997) (member of Congress described marriage as a “covenant established 
by God” when voting on the federal Defense of Marriage Act) (quoting 142 CONG. REC. H7442 
(daily ed. July 11, 1996) (statement of Rep. Hutchinson); 142 CONG. REC. H7441 (daily ed. July, 
11, 1996) (statement of Rep. Canady) (commenting on same-sex marriage being against “our 
Judeo-Christian moral tradition” when voting on the federal Defense of Marriage Act)). 
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B.  Current State of the Law on Same-Sex Marriage 
In the United States, the majority of the states21 have enacted sta-
tutes expressly prohibiting same-sex marriage.22  While there are a few 
                                                                                                                           
 21 The District of Columbia is included as a “state” for the purposes of this Comment. 
 22 States that have laws expressly prohibiting same-sex marriage include: ALA. CODE § 30-
1-19 (2006) (“Marriage . . . between persons of the same sex prohibited.”); ALASKA STAT. § 
25.05.011 (2006) (“[M]arriage . . . by persons of the same sex . . . is void in this state . . . .  A same-
sex relationship may not be recognized by the state as being entitled to the benefits of mar-
riage.”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §25-101 (West, Westlaw through End of Forty Seventh Legisla-
ture, First Regular Sess. 2005) (“Marriage between persons of same sex is void and prohibited.”); 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-109 (West, Westlaw through 2005 Sess.) (“Same sex marriage void”); 
CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5 (West, Westlaw through 2005 Reg. Sess.) (“Only marriage between a 
man and a woman is valid or recognized . . . .”), but see In re Marriage Cases, S147999 (Cal. Sup. 
Ct., May 15, 2008) (recently held statute unconstitutional); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-2-104 (2001) 
(“[Marriage] is only between one man and one woman.”); DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 13, § 101a (2006) 
(“[M]arriage is prohibited and void between . . . persons of the same gender.”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
741.212 (2006) (“Marriages between persons of the same sex . . . are not recognized for any pur-
pose in this State.”); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1 (2004) (“Same sex marriages prohibited”); HAW. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 572-1 (2006) (“[M]arriage contract . . . only between a man and a woman . . . 
.”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-209 (2004) (“Marriages that violate the public policy of this state 
include . . . same-sex marriages . . . .”); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/212 (2001) (“Prohibited Marriages . 
. . a marriage between 2 individuals of the same sex.”); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-11-1-1 (2002) 
(“Same sex marriages prohibited”); IOWA CODE ANN. § 595.2 (2006) (“Only a marriage between 
a male and a female is valid.”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-101 (2003) (“[M]arriage contract . . . be-
tween two parties . . . of the opposite sex.  All other marriages . . . are void . . . .”); KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 402.020 (2006) (“Other prohibited marriages . . . Between members of the same sex . . . .”); 
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 89 (2006) (“Persons of the same sex may not contract marriage . . . .”); 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A-2, § 23-I-701 (2006) (“Same sex marriage prohibited.”); MD. CODE 
ANN. FAM. LAW, [Marriage] § 2-201 (2006) (“Only a marriage between a man and a woman is 
valid in this State.”); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 551.1.1 (2006) (“[M]arriage . . . between individ-
uals of the same sex is invalid in this state.”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 517.01 (2007) (“Lawful mar-
riage may be contracted only between persons of the opposite sex . . . Prohibited marriages . . . 
between persons of the same sex”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-1-1.2 (2006) (“[M]arriage between 
persons of the same gender is prohibited and null and void . . . .”); MO. STAT. ANN. § 451.022.2 
(2007) (“Any purported marriage not between a man and a woman is invalid.”); MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 40-1-401 (2005) (“[M]arriages . . . prohibited . . . marriage between persons of the same 
sex.”); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-1 (2001) (Cross references NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29, where mar-
riage is void and prohibited by constitutional amendment); Nev. REV. STAT. ANN. § 122.020.1 
(2006) (“A male and a female person . . . may be joined in marriage.”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
457:1 and 457:2 (2006) (“No man shall marry . . . any other man. . . . No woman shall marry . . . any 
other woman.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-1.2 (2006) (“Marriages between persons of the same 
gender not valid”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03-01 (2005) (“Marriage is . . . between one man and 
one woman . . . .  A spouse refers only to a person of the opposite sex . . . .”); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 3101.01 (C) (1) (2006) (“Any marriage between persons of the same sex is against the 
strong public policy of this state.”); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 3.1 (2006) (“Recognition of mar-
riage between persons of same gender prohibited”); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 106.010 (2004) (al-
though the statutory text appears ambiguous, referring to “Marriage [as] a civil contract entered 
into in person by males and females . . .,” the court in Heisler v. Heisler, 55 P. 2d 727 (Or. 1936), 
held that “‘marriage’ is a civil contract entered into with state’s consent between man and wom-
an”); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1704 (2006) (“Marriage between persons of same sex . . . shall be 
void . . . .”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-15 (2006) (“[M]arriage between persons of the same sex is 
void . . . .”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-1-1 (2005) (“Marriage is a personal relation, between a 
man and a woman . . . . ”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-113 (2006) (The legal union . . . of only one 
 
118 FIU Law Review [3:113 
states that do not expressly prohibit same-sex marriage, most of these 
states have statutory text that indicates an implied prohibition be-
cause they use statutory language that definitionally excludes same-
sex couples.23  For example, the use of language such as “bride” and 
“groom,” and “husband” and “wife,” promotes opposite-sex marriage 
and impliedly excludes same-sex marriages.   
In Massachusetts, however, the state Supreme Court declared the 
prohibition of same-sex marriage unconstitutional in Goodridge v. 
Department of Public Health, effectively striking the ban on same-sex 
marriage.24  Being the first state whose court effectively struck the 
                                                                                                                           
(1) man and one (1) woman shall be the only recognized . . . .”); TEX. MARRIAGE CODE ANN. § 
2.001 (b) (2006) (A license may not be issued for the marriage of persons of the same sex.”); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-1 (2006) (“Marriages prohibited and void . . . between persons of the 
same sex.”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8 (2006) (“Marriage is the legally recognized union of one 
man and one woman.”); VA. CODE  ANN. § 20-45.2 (2006) (“[M]arriage between persons of the 
same sex is prohibited.”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.04.020 (2007) (“Marriages . . . prohibited: . 
. . When the parties are persons other than a male and a female.”); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-2-104 
(2006) (“Marriage is designed to be a loving and lifelong union between a woman and a man.”); 
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 765.001 (1) (2) (2006) (“[M]arriage is a legal relationship between 2 equal 
persons, a husband and a wife . . . .”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-101 (2006) (“Marriage is . . . be-
tween a male and a female . . . .”). 
 23 See, e.g., the following states that have an implied prohibition of same-sex marriage 
based on the text of their laws definitionally excluding same-sex marriages: CONN. GEN. STAT. § 
46B-25 (in reference to marriage licenses, states that social security of the “bride and groom” are 
to be included); D.C. CODE § 46 (2006) (text impliedly excludes same-sex marriage by prohibiting 
a man from marrying certain grades of female relatives, but not excluding the same grades of 
male relatives, and by prohibiting women from marrying certain grades of male relatives, but not 
excluding the same grades of female relatives, as affirmed by the court in In re M.M.D., 662 A. 2d 
837, 849 n.13 (D.C. 1995), which held that “District of Columbia’s substantially gender-neutral 
marriage statute does not authorize same-sex marriage . . . [where] the gender-specific language 
of the consanguinity provision . . . with the traditional understanding of the word ‘marriage,’ left 
no doubt that same-sex marriages were excluded.”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 207 (2006) (text 
impliedly excludes same-sex marriage by prohibiting a man from marrying certain grades of 
female relatives, but not excluding the same grades of male relatives, and by prohibiting women 
from marrying certain grades of male relatives, but not excluding the same grades of female 
relatives); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37 (2006) (text impliedly excludes same-sex marriage by prohibiting a 
man from marrying certain grades of female relatives, but not excluding the same grades of male 
relatives, and by prohibiting women from marrying certain grades of male relatives, but not 
excluding the same grades of female relatives); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40 (2006) (text uses terms like 
“bride” and “groom” language, indicating the preference for opposite sex marriage); N.Y. DOM. 
REL. LAW § 14 (2006) (ch. 328 (except for ch. 1 to 3, 105, 110, 149, 161, 214, 239, 243, 262, 284 and 
316)) (indicating voidable marriages include marriages between aunt and nephew, and uncle and 
niece, textually implying marriage is between persons of opposite sexes); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-1-2 
and 15-1-2 (2003) (text impliedly excludes same-sex marriage by prohibiting a man from marry-
ing certain grades of female relatives, but not excluding the same grades of male relatives, and by 
prohibiting women from marrying certain grades of male relatives, but not excluding the same 
grades of female relatives). 
 24 See Goodridge, 798 N.E. 2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (finding same-sex marriage prohibition 
unconstitutional).  See also, In re Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E. 2d 565 (Mass. 
2004) (clarified that only same-sex marriage will satisfy the State’s constitution). 
2007] The Same-Sex Marriage Prohibition 119 
prohibition against same-sex marriage,25 a review of the case is in good 
order.   
The plain text of the Massachusetts marriage law implied a pro-
hibition against same-sex couples being able to marry.26  This was the 
basis upon which the plaintiffs in Goodridge, who were same-sex 
couples, were denied marriages licenses.27  The court first established 
that the “history of marriage” being between one man and one wom-
an in the state of Massachusetts does not foreclose the question of the 
constitutionality of the statute forbidding same-sex couples from mar-
rying.28  The court then turned to whether prohibiting same-sex mar-
riage violated the plaintiffs’ right to equality before the law and 
whether the liberty and due process provisions of the state constitu-
tion secured the plaintiffs’ right to marry their chosen partner.29   
                                                                                                                           
 25 The Supreme Court in Hawaii had also ruled that the prohibition of same-sex marriage 
was unconstitutional.  See Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *19 (Haw. Cir. Ct. 
Dec. 3, 1996).  The court held that the gender based classification for marriage violated the state 
constitution’s Equal Protection clause.  Id.  The court’s ruling, however, was later superseded by 
the addition of a state constitutional amendment: “The legislature shall have the power to re-
serve marriage to opposite-sex couples.” HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23 (2006).   
Another recent development “in the news” on the issue of same-sex marriage lies in Iowa 
where, similar to the Goodridge Court, a District judge pronounced the Iowa Defense of Mar-
riage Act statute unconstitutional (based upon Iowa’s state Constitution) on the ground the law 
fails rational basis review.  See Chase Martin, Iowa Judge Rules in Favor of Gay Marriage, IOWA 
INDEPENDENT, Aug. 30, 2007, http://www.iowaindependent.com/showDiary.do?diaryId=916 (last 
visited Feb. 23, 2008) (Iowa newspaper article discussing the Polk County judge’s decision strik-
ing down the Iowa DOMA law against same-sex marriage as unconstitutional for not meeting 
rational basis review); see also Arthur S. Leonard, Iowa Trial Courts Rules for Same-Sex Couples 
in Marriage Case, LEONARD LINK, Aug. 30, 2007, 
http://newyorklawschool.typepad.com/leonardlink/2007/08/iowa-trial-cour.html (last visited Feb. 
23, 2008) (further discussing the Polk County case and enumerating the defendant’s “proposed 
five rationales supporting the DOMA: promoting procreation, child rearing by a mother and 
father in a marriage relationship, promoting stability in opposite-sex relationships, conservation 
of state and private resources, and promoting the concept or integrity of traditional marriage.”).  
The decision was stayed by the judge a few hours after being issued, and is pending appeal.  See 
Monica Davey, Iowa Permits Same-Sex Marriage, for 4 Hours, Anyway, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/01/us/01iowa.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2008) (decision stayed); 
see also Iowa Court Rules Same-Sex Couples Can Marry, CNN.COM, Aug. 31, 2007, 
http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/law/08/30/iowa.samesexmarriage/index.html (last visited Feb. 23, 
2008) (cases advanced to Iowa Supreme Court). Most recently, California lifted its ban on same-
sex marriage.  See In re Marriage Cases (2008) 43 Cal.4th 757 [76 Cal.Rptr.3d 683, 183 P.3d 384].  
The court’s ruling was made final June 19, 2008, although current efforts are already underway to 
overrule the court’s decision through constitutional amendment.  See California’s General Elec-
tion Ballot, Proposition 8 – Eliminates Right of Same-Sex Couples to Marry (to be voted on in 
the November 2008 elections). 
 26 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 207 § 1 (2006) (prohibiting women from marrying certain 
grades of male relatives, but not excluding the same grades of female relatives).  
 27 Goodridge, 798 N.E. 2d at 949-50. 
 28 Id. at 953. 
 29 Id. 
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The Supreme Court in Goodridge likened the prohibition on 
same-sex marriage to the not so distant prohibition on interracial 
marriages that came to an end in 1967 when the Supreme Court of the 
United States (SCOTUS) held, in Loving v. Virginia,30 that a statutory 
bar to interracial marriage violated the Fourteenth amendment of the 
U. S. Constitution.31  This decision came nineteen years after California 
ruled, in Perez, that the prohibition on interracial marriages was un-
constitutional because it violated the due process and equality guaran-
tees of the Fourteenth Amendment.32  The Goodridge Court said that 
Perez and Loving made clear that the right to marry “means little if it 
does not include the right to marry the person of one’s choice, subject 
to appropriate government restrictions in the interests of public 
health, safety, and welfare.”33  Just as in Perez and Loving, the court 
reasoned, “a statute deprives individuals access to an institution of 
fundamental legal, personal, and social significance . . . because of one 
single trait:  skin color in Perez and Loving, sexual orientation [in 
Goodridge].”34   
Finding that no fundamental interest or suspect class was at issue, 
the court applied the lowest standard of constitutional review: rational 
basis review.35  The Commonwealth argued three bases for prohibiting 
same-sex marriage: “(1) providing a ‘favorable setting for procrea-
tion’; (2) ensuring the optimal setting for child rearing . . . ; and (3) 
preserving scarce State and private financial resources.”36 
Addressing the first basis of procreation, the Goodridge Court 
repudiated procreation as the primary purpose of marriage by im-
pliedly distinguishing civil marriage from religious marriage when 
noting that civil marriage “does not privilege procreative couples 
above every other form of adult intimacy and every other mean of 
creating a family.”37  Massachusetts has no requirement of ability and 
intent to procreate by coitus, nor is fertility a condition to marriage or 
ground for divorce; and, people who have never consummated their 
marriage can be married, and those unable to consummate their mar-
riage may also marry.38  Furthermore, the Commonwealth “affirma-
tively facilitates bringing children into a family regardless of whether 
the intended parent is married or unmarried, whether the child is 
                                                                                                                           
 30 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967). 
 31 Goodridge, 798 N.E. 2d at 958. 
 32 Id. (citing Perez. v. Sharp, 198 P. 2d 17 (Cal. 1948)). 
 33 Goodridge, 798 N.E. 2d at 958 (emphasis added).   
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. at 961. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
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adopted or born into a family, whether assistive technology was used 
to conceive the child, and whether the parent is heterosexual, homo-
sexual, or bisexual.”39  The court stated that if procreation were neces-
sary to civil marriage, the statutes would draw a tighter circle around 
non-marital child bearing and the creation of families by non-coital 
means, noting that in such “fundamentally private areas of life, such a 
narrow focus is inappropriate.”40  By singling out a single trait, an un-
bridgeable difference between same-sex and opposite-sex couples, and 
transforming it into the essence of legal marriage, the court said that 
the State’s actions “confer[] an official stamp of approval on the de-
structive stereotype that same-sex relationships are inherently unsta-
ble and inferior . . . and not worthy of respect.”41 
Addressing the second basis, the court found that denying same-
sex marriage does not further the state interest of ensuring that child-
ren are raised in an “optimal” setting42 because the best interests of a 
child are not dependent on the parents’ sexual orientation or marital 
status.43  And, since there is no evidence that prohibiting same-sex 
marriage will increase the number of couples entering into opposite-
sex marriage to raise children, the court found there is no rational re-
lationship between the statute and the state’s goal.44  The court con-
cluded that “[e]xcluding same-sex couples from civil marriage will not 
make children of opposite-sex marriages more secure, but it does pre-
vent children of same-sex couples from enjoying the immeasurable 
advantages that flow from the assurance of ‘a stable family structure 
in which children will be reared, educated, and socialized.’”45 
The third rationale given by the state in Goodridge was that pro-
hibiting same-sex marriage would preserve the scarce resources of the 
state because same-sex couples are less dependent on each other than 
opposite-sex couples.46  The court refuted this rationale because the 
state’s “conclusory generalization – that same-sex couples are less 
financially dependent on each other . . . ignores that many same-sex 
couples . . . have children and other dependents . . . in their care.”47  In 
addition, the state does not bestow the economic benefits of marriage 
to opposite-sex couples on showing of their financial dependence on 
                                                                                                                           
 39 Id. at 962. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id.  
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. at 964 (Cordy, J., dissenting) (quoting Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 440 
Mass. 309, 381 (2003)). 
 46 Goodridge, 798 N.E. 2d at 964.   
 47 Id. 
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each other.48  Based on these factors, the court found that there was no 
rational relationship between the prohibition of same-sex marriage 
and the state’s economic goals.49 
At the end of the day, while the Massachusetts Supreme Court 
gave “full deference to the arguments of the Commonwealth,”50 it 
found that the Commonwealth failed to identify “any constitutionally 
adequate reason for denying civil marriage to same-sex couples.”51  
The court held that prohibiting same-sex marriage did not serve the 
“protection of public health, safety, or general welfare,” but that it was 
rather rooted in “persistent prejudices,” and that it is not for the Con-
stitution to give such prejudices effect.52 
In reaction53 to the Goodridge Court’s holding that prohibiting 
same-sex marriage is unconstitutional and violates the state’s Equal 
Rights amendment,54 a number of states enacted constitutional 
amendments that either expressly define marriage as only being be-
tween a man and a woman or expressly prohibit same-sex marriage.55  
                                                                                                                           
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. at 948. 
 51 Id.  
 52 Id. at 968. 
 53 Following is an enumeration of the states who enacted constitutional amendments in 
reaction to Goodridge (organized alphabetically by state): Alabama- 2005; Arkansas- Nov. 2004; 
Georgia- Nov. 2004; Louisiana- Sept. 2004; Michigan- Dec. 2004; Mississippi- Nov. 2004; Missouri- 
2004; Montana- Nov. 2004; North Dakota- 2004; Ohio- 2004; Okalahoma- 2004; Oregon- 2004; 
Utah- 2004, Texas- 2005.  Several states  passed constitutional amendments to prohibit same-sex 
marriage prior to Goodridge: Hawaii- 1998; Nebraska- 2000; Nevada- 2002.  See also infra note 
55, for respective citations of the states’ constitutional amendments. 
 54 Goodridge, 798 N.E. 2d at 969.   
 55 See ALA. CONST. 2005-35 (2006) (“Marriage is inherently . . . between a man and a wom-
an.”); ALASKA CONST.  art. I, § 25 (2006) (“[M]arriage may exist only between one man and one 
woman.”); ARK. CONST. amend. 83 § 1 (2006) (“Marriage consists only . . . of one man and one 
woman.”); GA. CONST. art. I, § IV, p. 1 (2006) (“Marriages between persons of the same sex are 
prohibited . . . .”); HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23 (2006) (“[L]egislature shall have the power to limit 
marriage to opposite-sex couples.”); KY. CONST. § 233A (2006) (“Only a marriage between one 
man and one woman shall be valid or recognized . . . .”); LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15 (2006) (“Mar-
riage . . . shall consist only of . . . one man and one woman.”); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 25 (2006) 
(“Union of one man and one woman as only agreement recognized as marriage . . . .”); MISS. 
CONST. art. 14, § 263A (2006) (“Marriage may take place . . . only between a man and a wom-
an.”); MO. CONST. art. I, § 33 (2005) (“Only marriage between a man and a woman recognized as 
valid”); MONT. CONST. art. XIII, § 7 (2005) (“Only a marriage between one man and one woman 
shall be valid or recognized . . . .”); NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29 (2006) (“The uniting of two persons of 
the same sex in a civil union, domestic partnership, or other similar same-sex relationship shall 
not be valid or recognized . . . .”).  It should be noted that this constitutional amendment was 
held to violate the United States Constitution by a federal District Court in Citizen for Equal 
Protection, Inc. v. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Neb. 2005); NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 21 (2006) 
(“Only a marriage between a male and a female person shall be recognized and given effect . . . 
.”); N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 28 (2006) (“Marriage consists only of the legal union between a man 
and a woman.”); OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11 (2006) (“Only a union between one man and one 
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C.  States’ Bases for Prohibiting Same-Sex Marriage 
Of the states that prohibit same-sex marriage, either expressly or 
impliedly, only a select few have included either the rationale for the 
prohibition or the rationale for their marriage laws within their sta-
tute.56  However, in the majority of the remaining states the rationales 
for the prohibition of same-sex marriage are advanced and argued in 
the case law.57  A few of these courts have expressly declared a reli-
                                                                                                                           
woman may be . . . valid and recognized . . . .”); OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 35 (2006) (“Marriage . . . 
shall consist only of . . . one man and one woman.”); OR. CONST, art. XV, § 5a (2004) (“[O]nly a 
marriage between one man and one woman shall be valid or legally recognized as marriage.”); 
TEX. CONST. art. I, § 32 (2006) (“Marriage in this state shall consist only of the union of one man 
and one woman.”); UTAH CONST. art. I, § 29 (2006) (“Marriage consists only of . . . a man and a 
woman.”). 
 56 Following is an enumeration of the state marriage statutes that include the rationale for 
the prohibition, or for the marriage laws, within their statute: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §25-103 
(2002) (public policy is “To promote strong families” and “To promote strong family values”); 
19-A-2 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 23-I, § 650 (1) (A) and (2) (2006) (declares the compelling state 
interest to “nurture and promote the unique institution of monogamous traditional marriage in 
the support of harmonious families and the physical and mental health of children,” and to 
“promot[e] the moral values inherent in traditional monogamous families,” and the purposes of 
the statute as: “A. To encourage the traditional monogamous family unit as the basic building 
block of our society, the foundation of harmonious and enriching family life; B. To nurture, sus-
tain and protect the traditional monogamous family unit in Maine society, its moral imperatives, 
its economic function and its unique contribution to the rearing of healthy children; and C. To 
support and strengthen traditional monogamous Maine families against improper interference 
from out-of-state influences or edicts.”); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 551.1.1 (2006) (“As a matter 
of public policy, this state has a special interest in encouraging, supporting, and protecting that 
unique [between a man and a woman] relationship in order to promote, among other goals, the 
stability and welfare of society and its children.”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 765.001 (1) (2) (2006) (“It is 
the intent . . . to promote the stability and best interests of marriage and the family. . . . [T]o rec-
ognize the valuable contributions of both spouses during the marriage and at termination of the 
marriage . . . .  [It] . . . is the foundation of the family and of society.  Its stability is basic to morali-
ty and civilization, and of vital interest to society and the state.”). 
 57 See, e.g., Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562, 1998 WL 88743, at *6 
(Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998) (Superior Court recognized “procreation” as an oft-cited rea-
son for marriage); Standahrdt v. Superior Court, 77 P. 3d 451 (Ariz. 2003) (finding state has legi-
timate interest in encouraging procreation and child rearing within marriage); Adams v. Hower-
ton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (“[E]ncouraging and fostering procreation of the 
race . . . .”); In re Coordination Proceeding, 2005 WL 583129, at *11 (consolidation of six mar-
riage cases in which State of California offered “tradition,” “tradition plus marriage rights with-
out marriage,” and “procreation” as rational bases for same-sex marriage ban); Knight v. 
Schwarzenegger, Nos., 03AS05284, 03AS07035, 2004 WL 2011407, at *6 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. 
Ct.) (stated marriage is the “keystone of civilized society . . . [whose] interest [is] to maintain . . . 
marriage for . . . societal goals ranging from property rights to procreation”); Schaefer v. Denver, 
973 P.2d 717, 721 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998) (stated a “legislative intent to strengthen and preserve the 
integrity of marriage and the safeguarding of meaningful family relationships . . . .”); Rosengar-
ten v. Downes, 802 A.2d 170, 179-80 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002) (pointed to ‘custom’ and ‘tradition’ as 
sources of law in establishing who may marry); Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A. 2d 307, 337 
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (“[T]o regulate and legitimize the procreation of children . . . .”); Dean v. District 
of Columbia, No. 90-13892, 1992 WL 685364, at *4 (D.C. Super. June 2, 2002) (state interests 
include “procreation,” “legislative authorization of homosexual, same-sex marriages would 
constitute tacit state approval . . . of the sexual conduct . . . [of] sodomy . . . ;” and that “such 
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authorization would constitute unprecedented and unwarranted ‘social tinkering’ with one of the 
most sacred institutions known . . . namely, marriage . . . .”); Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 
1308 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (“foster development of relationships optimal for procreation, thereby 
encouraging the ‘stable generational continuity of the United States’” and “encouraging creation 
of stable relationships that facilitate the rearing of children by both their biological parents” as 
state interests justifying the federal DOMA law, cited by court in a lawsuit by two lesbians mar-
ried in Massachusetts); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P. 2d 44, 52 (Haw. 1993) (state’s basis as ‘protecting, 
fostering, helping perpetuate the basic family unit that provides status and a nurturing environ-
ment to children born to married persons,’ and ‘statement of moral values of the community’); 
Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *3 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996) (state interests 
included ‘protect the health and welfare of children,’ ‘foster procreation within the marital set-
ting,’ ‘promote optimal development of children,’ ‘it is best for children to be raised in a single 
home by its parents, or at least by a married male and female,’ ‘to have mothers and fathers take 
responsibility for their children,’ ‘to unite children with their mothers and fathers’); Jones v. 
Hallahan, 501 S.W. 2d 588, 589 (Ky. App. Ct. 1973) (court adopted outside sources for the basis of 
marriage, including “institution whereby men and women are joined . . . for the purpose of 
founding and maintaining a family,” “civil status . . . for the discharge to each other and the 
community of the duties legally incumbent upon those whose association is founded on the 
distinction of sex,” and “custom,” admittedly originating in the church); ACLU v. Echohawk, 857 
P. 2d 626, 627-28 (Idaho 1993) (proposed code amendment being challenged, where the prohibi-
tion of same-sex marriage was expressly based on IDAHO CONST. art. 3, § 24, which would then 
make “virtue . . . sobriety of the people . . . purity of the home . . . and . . . promotion of temper-
ance and morality” the basis for the prohibition); Morrison v. Sadler, No. 49D13-0211-PL-001946, 
2003 WL 23119998, at *4-6 (Ind. Super. Ct. May 7, 2003), affirmed Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E. 2d 
15 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (“[E]nshrine . . . traditional definition and traditional understanding of 
marriage . . . encouraging procreation . . . where both biological parents can raise the child . . . .  
[P]romoting the traditional family as the basic living unit of society. . . .  [P]rotecting the integrity 
of traditional marriage.”); Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E. 2d 15, 25 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (fostering 
interest in “responsible procreation”); Forum for Equality v. McKeithen, 893 So. 2d 715, 736 (La. 
2005) (states “defend traditional marriage” -- but offers no underlying basis for the ‘tradition’); 
Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W. 2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971) (listed procreation, rearing of children within 
families, and history as basis); S.B. v. L.W., 793 So. 2d 656, 662 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001) (this pre-
Lawrence adoption case reiterated the state’s prohibition on same-sex marriage, stating it is an 
“abominable crime against nature”); J.P. v. P.W., 772 S.W. 2d 786, 792 (Mo. Ct. App. S.D. 1989) 
(child custody case, which stated, the state has a “concern for perpetuating the values associated 
with conventional marriage and the family as the basic unit of society, the state has substantial 
interest in viewing homosexuality as errant sexual behavior which threatens the social fabric. . . 
.”); Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 980, 1000 (D. Neb. 2005) (state interests 
include procreation, preservation of traditional marriage, and promote family life); Lewis v. 
Harris, 875 A.2d 259, 272-76 n.4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 2005) (stated nations’ history and traditions, 
contemporary religious and cultural values, and public interests to “control” procreation as 
fundamental, originating reason why the state privileges marriage); Lewis v. Harris, No.15-03, 
2003 WL 23191114, 11-17 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Nov. 5, 2003) (stated tradition through 
longstanding definition of marriage as between a man and a woman is seen as a sufficiently 
rational basis to prohibit same-sex marriage); Hernandez v. Robles, 794 N.Y.S. 2d 579, 597-99 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005) (cited “Tradition” and “Ensuring Consistency with Federal Law and Other 
States” as state interests); Seymour v. Holcomb, 790 N.Y.S. 2d 858, 860 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005) (cited 
“preserving historic institution of marriage as union between man and woman, which, in turn, 
uniquely fostered procreation”); Shields v. Madigan, 783 N.Y.S. 2d 270, 272 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004) 
(cited “preserving traditional and legal concept of marriage”); Storrs v. Holcomb, 645 N.Y.S. 2d 
286, 287 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996) (cited “long tradition of marriage . . . testifies to a contrary political, 
cultural, religious and legal consensus”); People v. West, 780 N.Y.S. 2d 723, 725 (N.Y. J. Ct. 2004) 
(cited “history, cultural, and religious opposition to same-sex marriage”); People v. Greenleaf , 
780 N.Y.S. 2d 899 (N.Y. J. Ct. 2004) (cited “providing favorable environment for procreation and 
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gious basis for the state’s same-sex marriage prohibition in their deci-
sions.58  In light of all this legislative and judicial action, however, just 
over half the states still do not seem to have a basis for their prohibi-
tion either in the statutory text or in their case law.59  At least one state 
however, Arizona, has a case that provides a rationale against same-
sex marriage that is additional to the rationale found within the state’s 
marriage laws.60  Similarly, in some states the basis for prohibiting 
same-sex marriage has differed from case to case.61  And, at least two 
                                                                                                                           
child-rearing”); Constant v. Paul, 496 A. 2d 1, 6 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (stated denial of same-sex 
marriage and history, cultural, and religious opposition to same-sex marriage rights is based on 
“social values” for the “propagation of the human race”); Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 865 
(Vt. 1999) (stated “furthering the link between procreation and child rearing”); Singer v. Hara, 
522 P.2d 1187, 1195 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (cited procreation and rearing of children as basis for 
denying same-sex marriage); Andersen v. King County, 04-2-04964-4-SEA, 2004 WL 1738447, *7-
9 (Wash. Super. Ct. Nov. 4, 2004) (analyzed bases of morality, tradition, protecting marriage, 
protecting children from harm of non-traditional family); Castle v. State, No. 042-00614-4,  2004 
WL 1985215, *13, 14 (Wash. Super. Ct. Sept. 7, 2004) (cited historical commitment to heterosex-
ual marriage, encourage procreation and rearing of children within stable households). 
 58 See, e.g., Ex Parte H.H., 830 So. 2d 21, 26 (Ala. 2002) (Moore, J., concurring) (in child 
custody case, where mother then engaged in a same-sex relationship sought to have custody of 
her child, court stated that “Alabama expressly does not recognize same-sex marriages . . . .  
Homosexual conduct is, and always has been, considered abhorrent, immoral, detestable, a crime 
against nature, and a violation of the laws of nature and of nature’s God upon which this Nation 
and our laws are predicated.  Such conduct . . . is destructive to a basic building block of society – 
the family . . . .  [T]he courts of this State have consistently held that exposing a child to such 
behavior has a destructive and seriously detrimental effect on the children.  It is an inherent evil 
against which children must be protected.”); Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. 
Wilkerson, 876 So. 2d 1006, 1013-14 (Miss. 2004) (although not a case directly stating religion as 
basis, discusses a judge who made statements to the press against same-sex marriage, stating they 
belonged in mental institutions, based on his deeply held religious beliefs).  
 59 A search of the statutory and constitutional texts, as well as the case law, of the following 
states and their respective federal districts, did not yield any rationale for the prohibition of 
same-sex marriage: Arkansas, Delaware, Florida (although Florida had a federal district court 
case that addressed the rationale behind the Federal DOMA law, see Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 
2d 1298), Georgia, Kansas, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New 
Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, 
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. 
 60 Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §25-103 (2002) (public policy is “To promote strong 
families” and “To promote strong family values”), with Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P. 3d 
451, 463-64 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004) (Gemmill, J. and Portley, M., concurring) (recognized that “en-
couraging procreation and child rearing within the marital relationship [are legitimate state 
interests] and that limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples is rationally related to that inter-
est.”). 
 61 See, e.g., Ex Parte H.H., 830 So. 2d 21, 26 (Ala. 2002) (Moore, J., concurring) (in child 
custody case, where mother then engaged in a same-sex relationship sought to have custody of 
her child, court stated that “Alabama expressly does not recognize same-sex marriages . . . .  
Homosexual conduct is, and always has been, considered abhorrent, immoral, detestable, a crime 
against nature, and a violation of the laws of nature and of nature’s God upon which this Nation 
and our laws are predicated.  Such conduct . . . is destructive to a basic building block of society – 
the family . . . .  [T]he courts of this State have consistently held that exposing a child to such 
behavior has a destructive and seriously detrimental effect on the children.  It is an inherent evil 
against which children must be protected.”); Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. 
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of the states have different bases enumerated in different courts on 
the same case.62 
The various bases that are enumerated in the state statutes, con-
stitutional amendments, and case law can be classified into six catego-
ries.  These are: preserving history and tradition, promoting moral val-
ues, pro-creation, protecting the traditional family, promoting the wel-
fare of children, and promoting a political purpose. 
D.  The Federal Paradigm of Same-Sex Marriage 
While an examination of the issue of comity between states is not 
within the scope of this paper, it will be examined briefly.  The reason 
for its inclusion is to help establish the effect of the federal Defense of 
Marriage Act (DOMA)63 as a compelling force in the states’ stance 
against same-sex marriage and to provide foundation for some of the 
issues discussed below. 
The very title of Defense of Marriage Act, which Congress passed 
in 1996, implied that marriage was under attack.64  DOMA focused 
specifically on granting states the right to refuse to extend comity to 
the same-sex marriages recognized in other states.65  More specifically, 
the implication is that marriage is under attack by same-sex couples.  
Such a legal theoretical framework on the part of the federal govern-
ment is highly relevant because while the body of the Act appears to 
leave the definitional question of marriage to the states, the title im-
plies that same-sex couples are a threat to the social institution of 
marriage and, by implication, to society.  Such an implication serves to 
perpetuate the fear that already exists in American society in regards 
to same-sex couples by “implement[ing] official prejudice against 
                                                                                                                           
Wilkerson, 876 So. 2d 1006, 1013-14 (Miss. 2004) (although not a case directly stating religion as 
basis, discusses a judge who made statements to the press against same-sex marriage, stating they 
belonged in mental institutions, based on his deeply held religious beliefs).. 
 62 See D.C., Indiana, and New Jersey cases, supra note 57 (different bases in Dean v. D.C. in 
the D.C. Circuit and D.C. Superior Courts; in Morrison v. Saddler in the Indiana Superior and 
Appellate Courts; in Lewis v. Harris in the N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. and N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.). 
 63 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2007). 
 64 It is quite poszsible that the Federal Government proposed DOMA in reaction to Baehr 
v. Lewin, 852 P. 2d 44 (Haw. 1993), a same-sex marriage case that won same-sex marriage in 
Hawaii, until it was later repealed by constitutional amendment.  See HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23 
(2006).  
 65 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2007) (stating that “[n]o State, territory, or possession of the United 
States, or Indian tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial pro-
ceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between per-
sons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, 
possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship”) (emphasis added). 
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gays,” as Senator Kennedy put it.66  The perpetuation of such fear and 
prejudice becomes more evident when a study of the legislative histo-
ry of the states reveals that after Goodridge67 legalized same-sex mar-
riage in Massachusetts, a number of states reactively latched on to the 
federal DOMA and enacted their own defense of marriage laws68 in 
order to “defend” marriage within their respective states. 
While many states latched on to DOMA, so to speak, and prohi-
bited recognition of the same-sex marriages of other states by enact-
ing their own defense of marriage laws,69 some scholars now argue that 
DOMA was unconstitutional because it effectively amended the Con-
stitution’s Full Faith and Credit Clause through a statutory enact-
ment.70  The United States Constitution requires states to give effect to 
each other’s acts, records, and proceedings, through the Full Faith and 
Credit clause.71  While the Full Faith and Credit clause allows Congress 
to “prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceed-
ings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof,”72 it does not give Con-
gress the authority to allow the states to deny recognition of these acts 
by effectively amending the United States Constitution through the 
passing of a federal statute.73  Not only is the Constitutionality of the 
federal DOMA questionable because it appears to effectively amend 
the Constitution through a legislative act, but that the vote was passed 
                                                                                                                           
 66 One Senator, in support of DOMA, claimed that same-sex marriage had led to the 
decline in heterosexual marriage in other countries.  Joanna Grossman, As the Federal Marriage 
Amendment Fails in the Senate, Recent and Older Examples in Legal History Provide Insight, 
FINDLAW’S WRIT, July 15, 2004, available at 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/grossman/20040715.html.  Also in support of DOMA, another Sena-
tor claimed that “traditional marriage” is “good for everyone.”  Id.  In contrast, Senator Edward 
Kennedy said, “DOMA was wrong because it constituted the implementation of official preju-
dice against gays.”  Id. 
 67 Goodridge, 798 N.E. 2d at 941. 
 68 As of July 15, 2004, 37 states had adopted their own DOMAs.  See Grossman, supra note 
66. See also Sarah Carlson-Wallrath, Why the Civil Institution of Marriage Must be Extended to 
Same-Sex Couples, 26 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 73, 88-89 (2004).  Texas followed and added a 
constitutional amendment, making it the 38th state to enact “defense of marriage” legislation.  See 
TEX. CONST. art. I, § 32. 
 69 See supra notes 22-23 and 55 for citations of statutes and constitutional amendments to 
protect marriage by barring same-sex marriage. 
 70 Grossman, supra note 66.  For more discussion on the constitutionality of the Defense of 
Marriage Act debate, see also Brian Bix, State of the Union: The States’ Interest in the Marital 
Status of Their Citizens, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 23-26 (2000). 
 71 Bix, supra note 70.  See also, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given 
to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other state.”). 
 72 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
 73 Grossman, supra note 66 (stating “An ordinary statute, Republicans now suggest, cannot 
have effectively amended the Constitution”).  See also, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.   
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in such a fashion as to seemingly legislate some of the legislators’ own 
religious views raises Establishment Clause issues as well.74 
This federal paradigm – that traditional marriage has to be pro-
tected from same-sex couples – is fueled by fears and has served as a 
compelling force in the states’ position on same-sex marriage.75  Much 
of these fears appear to be rooted in and fueled by Judeo-Christian 
beliefs. 
For example, the Congressional Record shows that, in support of 
DOMA, Senator Byrd declared: “‘Woe betide that society that fails to 
honor that heritage and begins to blur that tradition which was laid 
down by the Creator in the beginning . . . . Certainly we do not want to 
launch further assault on the institution of marriage by blurring its 
definition in this unwise way.’”76  Senator Coats invoked nature as 
marriage’s interminable source when he said: 
The definition of marriage is not created by politicians and 
judges, and it cannot be changed by them.  It is rooted in 
our history, in our laws and our deepest moral and religious 
convictions, and in our nature as human beings.  It is the un-
ion of one man and one woman.  This fact can be respected, 
or it can be resented, but it cannot be altered.77  
Statements such as these not only show that DOMA was passed 
in some measure based on religious ideology, but it also raises ques-
tions as to the states’ reasons for upholding a prohibition since these 
members of Congress are representing their respective state’s interest 
in Congress.  
E.  Establishment Clause Issue 
Historically religious institutions can, and have, become secula-
rized.  For example, in McGowan v. Maryland,78 one of the issues ad-
dressed by the SCOTUS was whether Sunday Closing Laws79 violated 
                                                                                                                           
 74 See infra note 408 for examples of legislators’ religiously based votes on DOMA. 
 75 The compelling force of the Federal DOMA becomes evident in light of 38 states having 
adopted their own DOMAs.  
 76 Heather Lauren Hughes, Note, Same-Sex Marriage and Simulacra: Exploring Concep-
tions of Equality, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 237, 243 (1998) (quoting 142 CONG. REC. S10, 110 
(daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Byrd)). 
 77 Id. at 245 (quoting 142 CONG. REC. S10, 113 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. 
Coats)) (emphasis added).   
 78 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).  
 79 See id. (Sunday Closing Laws are laws that mandated some degree or form of business 
closures, e.g. that businesses be closed on Sunday altogether, or that they be closed during certain 
hours on Sunday which generally coincided with hours of Christian worship).   
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the Establishment Clause.80  Ruling in the negative, the Court stated 
that the “‘Establishment’ Clause does not ban federal or state regula-
tion of conduct whose reason or effect merely happens to coincide or 
harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions.”81  In a separate 
McGowan opinion,82 Justice Frankfurter83 recognized that a state’s in-
terests may at times appear to endorse the ideals of religion when not-
ing that “[a]s the state’s interest in the individual becomes more com-
prehensive, its concerns and the concerns of religion perforce overlap.  
State codes and the dictates of faith touch the same activities.”84  
Therefore, an institution may become secularized in spite of its histor-
ical roots as a religious institution if it serves a current valid secular 
purpose.85  In McGowan, the Court held that while Sunday, as a day of 
rest, had been unquestionably religious in purpose,86 it had become 
secularized because the “present purpose and effect . . . [was] to pro-
vide a uniform day of rest . . . .”87   
Marriage is another example of an institution that has its histori-
cal roots in religious ideals, yet has become secularized over its legal 
evolution.  The law of marriage in the United States reflects a strong 
historical link to Judeo-Christian religious origins.88  The structure of 
the marriage laws is traceable to fifth century theologizing, which was 
later reduced to a legal framework by canon lawyers.89  This history 
has been acknowledged all the way to the SCOTUS, as is evident on 
examination of Justice Story’s 1834 Commentaries of the Conflict of 
Laws, which advocated that marriage was a religious institution that 
started with “Adam and Eve” and that it was a religious as well as a 
civil contract.90  
Marriage laws have evolved, however, to serve many secular pur-
poses in the United States.  The Supreme Court of Massachusetts, for 
example, recognized that marriage in Massachusetts was not religious-
                                                                                                                           
 80 McGowan, 366 U.S. at 422.  
 81 Id. at 442. 
 82 Id. at 459-551. 
 83 Joined by Justice Harlan. 
 84 McGowan, 366 U.S. at 461. 
 85 Id. at 444 (“In light of the evolution of our Sunday Closing Laws through centuries, and 
of their more or less recent emphasis upon secular considerations, it is not difficult to discern 
that as presently written and administered, most of them, at least, are of a secular rather than of 
a religious character.”). 
 86 Id. at 487. 
 87 Id. at 445. 
 88 See supra section II-A.  See also Reid, supra note 18.  
 89 Reid, supra note 18, at 496. 
 90 Id. at 502-03 (citing Joseph Story, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 100 
(1834)). 
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ly driven but, rather, was civil and a “wholly secular institution.”91  The 
court saw civil marriage as created and regulated “through the exer-
cise of the police power . . . to [the] extent necessary . . . ‘to secure the 
health, safety, good order, comfort, or general welfare of the commu-
nity.’”92  One scholar argues that the Goodridge Court misrepresented 
the history of marriage by claiming that it is state created because the 
history of its religious roots as a source of authority for state law is 
well documented.93  In light of both the documented history of the ori-
gins of marriage and the Goodridge Court’s position on seeing mar-
riage as a secular institution, however, one can see an example of how 
the evolution of marriage from a religious institution to a secular insti-
tution with secular purposes can occur. 
That marriage as an institution has become secularized because it 
fulfills secular purposes does not necessarily imply that the prohibi-
tion of same-sex marriage that definitionally originated in Judeo-
Christian theology has been secularized as well.  It is entirely possible 
that while marriage has become secularized, same-sex marriage could 
continue to be prohibited based on religious reasons.   
In a 2002 case, for example, where a mother who was involved in 
a same-sex relationship sought to have custody of her child, Chief Jus-
tice Moore of the Alabama Supreme Court stated in a concurring opi-
nion: 
Alabama expressly does not recognize same-sex marriages . 
. . Homosexual conduct is, and has been, considered abhor-
rent, immoral, detestable, a crime against nature, and a vi-
olation of the laws of nature and of nature’s God upon 
which this Nation and our laws are predicated.  Such con-
duct . . . is destructive to a basic building block of society – 
the family. . . . [T]he courts of this State have consistently 
held that exposing a child to such behavior has a destructive 
and seriously detrimental effect on the children.  It is an in-
herent evil against which children must be protected.94 
While this view is that of the concurring Justice, and not formally 
adopted by the Court in the majority opinion, it reveals a view against 
same-sex marriage that strongly reflects the view upheld by traditional 
Judeo-Christian moral values and propagated by the canon law and 
                                                                                                                           
 91 Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E. 2d 941, 954 (Mass. 2003).  
 92 Id.   
 93 See Reid, supra note 18, at 517. 
 94 Ex Parte H.H., 830 So. 2d 21, 26 (Ala. 2002) (Moore, J., concurring). 
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the ecclesiastical courts.95  Arguably, such a basis for a majority deci-
sion would bluntly violate the separation of Church and State.96 
Similarly, in Mississippi, action was taken against a judge for 
statements he made to a newspaper regarding homosexuals.97  Missis-
sippi’s judicial Canon 4A(1) requires a judge to “conduct all extra-
judicial activities so that they do not cast doubt on the judge’s capacity 
to act impartially as a judge.”98  The judge opined, “homosexuals be-
long in mental institutions . . . homosexuality is an ‘illness’ . . . .”99  He 
further stated that his beliefs were grounded in his Christian faith and 
upon biblical principles.100  In finding that the judge’s anti-gay state-
ments were protected political speech under the First Amendment101 
because it deemed gay rights a political issue,102 the court failed to an-
swer the Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance’s concerns 
in regard to the judge’s ability to rule impartially, given his views 
against gays and lesbians.  While the views of a Justice in a concurring 
opinion and of a judge in a letter to a newspaper are not formally the 
views of a majority court, from these arise valid concerns of the judi-
ciary’s ability to remain impartial. It is necessary to question these 
judges/justices’ ability to not use their government position to pro-
mote the interests of their own religious views when ruling on the 
constitutionality of a statute prohibiting same-sex marriage. 
The focus, then, is whether the current reasons for prohibiting 
same-sex marriage continue to be rooted in religious ideals, or wheth-
er a valid secular purpose for the ongoing prohibition of same-sex 
marriage has evolved.  Traditional Judeo-Christianity has always de-
fined marriage as being solely the union of one man and one woman.103  
That “same-gender relations violate the historical western cultural 
ideals[,] [as is the case in the United States,] of what is morally proper 
human nature . . . [is] the expression of very old . . . ideas that derive 
from the Judeo-Christian worldview . . .,” which has long defined 
same-sex relations as sinful and morally improper.104   
                                                                                                                           
 95 The term “traditional Judeo-Christian moral values,” as used herein, refers to those 
principles of right and wrong driving the standard of behavior which were propagated by the 
Canon Laws and the Ecclesiastical Courts.  
 96 See infra section F for discussion of “separation of church and state” and the applicable 
test. 
 97 Mississippi Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Wilkerson, 876 So. 2d 1006, 1008-09 
(Miss. 2004). 
 98 Id. at 1009. 
 99 Id. at 1008. 
 100 Id.  
 101 Id. at 1016. 
 102 Id. at 1011. 
 103 See supra section II-A. 
 104 GILBERT HERDT, SAME-SEX, DIFFERENT CULTURES 22 (1997).   
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In McGowan, “Sunday [was] a word heavily overlaid with conno-
tations and traditions deriving from the Christian roots of our civiliza-
tion . . . .”105  Likewise, the same-sex marriage prohibition is heavily 
overlaid with connotations of the Christian roots of our civilization.  
And, whereas the McGowan Court determined that the Sunday Clos-
ing laws had become secular in purpose and therefore did not violate 
the Establishment Clause,106 similarly, this work seeks to analyze 
whether the prohibition of same-sex marriage has become secularized, 
or whether it continues to be rooted in Judeo-Christian ideals and 
thus violates the separation of Church and State under current Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence. 
What is, then, a “separation of Church and State”?  And what test 
is applied to determine if a law that has its origins in religion violates 
the separation of Church and State?  These questions call for a history 
of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, which has defined the rules 
and set the parameters for what it means to separate Church and 
State.   
F.  The Establishment Clause and the Lemon Test 
The Establishment Clause states “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion . . . .”107  It says nothing about 
the states not making a law regarding the establishment of religion.  In 
McGowan, however, the SCOTUS reaffirmed that the principles of 
the First Amendment apply equally to the states, through the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as they apply to the 
federal government.108   
In defining the scope of the First Amendment, the McGowan 
Court determined, based on the writings of Madison – who was the 
“architect” of the First Amendment, which passed in the Senate on 
September 9, 1789 – that the First Amendment protection extended to 
preventing the establishment of government religion.109  In light of its 
history and the framers’ intent, the SCOTUS has granted the amend-
ment broad interpretation.110  Thus, protection against the establish-
ment of religion means more than merely forbidding a national or 
state church.111  It has been interpreted to mean: 
                                                                                                                           
 105 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 565 (Douglas, J., dissenting).  
 106 See supra notes 80-89 and accompanying text. 
 107 U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
 108 McGowan, 366 U.S. at 430. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. at 441-42. 
 111 Id. at 442. 
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Neither a state nor the federal Government can set up a 
church.  Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all 
religions, or prefer one religion over another. . . . Neither a 
state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, 
participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or 
groups and vice versa.  In the words of Jefferson, the clause 
against establishment of religion by law was intended to 
erect ‘a wall of separation between church and State.’112 
However, Establishment Clause jurisprudence does not disallow 
a religious ideal from guiding any particular rule of law.113  Rather, it 
protects from “sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement 
of the sovereign in religious activity.”114  Some relationship between 
government and religious organizations is inevitable; total separation 
of Church and State is not possible in an absolute sense.115  The Estab-
lishment Clause, however, protects the integrity of the Church and the 
State by keeping the two institutions at arms length from each other.116   
In Lemon v. Kurtzman,117 where statutes providing financial sup-
port to teachers who taught secular subjects in parochial schools were 
held to violate the Establishment Clause, the Court introduced a 
three-prong test for analyzing government conduct under the Estab-
lishment Clause.118  The three-pronged test in Lemon [Lemon test] is 
the cumulative set of criteria the SCOTUS established over the years 
preceding Lemon when addressing Establishment Clause issues.119  
“First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its 
principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor in-
hibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster an excessive gov-
ernment entanglement with religion.”120 
While the Lemon test “remains the touchstone for Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence,” its formula has been modified over the years.121  
The modifications stem primarily from the efforts of Justice 
                                                                                                                           
 112 Id. at 443 (quoting Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947)). 
 113 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).  
 114 Id. at 612 (quoting Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)). 
 115 Id. at 614. 
 116 Citizens v. Montgomery County, No. Civ.A. AW-05-1194, 2005 WL 1075634, 8 (D. Md.) 
(citing McCollum v. Board of Ed., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948)). 
 117 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).  
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nonpublic schools involved excessive entanglement of church and state). 
 119 Id.  
 120 Id. at 612-13 (quoting Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968) and Walz V. 
Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)). 
 121 Marc L. Rubinstein, Note, Gay Rights and Religion: A Doctrinal Approach to the Argu-
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O’Connor.122  In Lynch v. Donnelly,123 a case in which the Court ad-
dressed whether a municipality’s display of a nativity scene violated 
the Establishment Clause, Justice O’Connor wrote a concurring opi-
nion with the primary purpose of clarifying Establishment Clause doc-
trine.124  In so doing, Justice O’Connor explained the Establishment 
Clause stands for two fundamental principles.125  First, that there 
should not be excessive entanglement between government and reli-
gious institutions.126  Excessive entanglement was defined as when the 
government intrudes on the activities of religious organizations in 
such a manner as to interfere with the institution’s independence, or 
to give religious institutions access to government or governmental 
powers that are not fully shared by non-adherents of religion, or to 
foster political constituencies that are defined by religion.127   
Second, that there should be no government endorsement or dis-
approval of religion.128  This second principle of the Establishment 
Clause, Justice Connor argued, embodies the first two prongs of the 
Lemon test.129  Justice O’Connor argued these two prongs had an ob-
jective and a subjective component.130  The purpose prong of the Lem-
on test asked that the government have a valid secular purpose.131  Jus-
tice O’Connor suggests “[t]he proper inquiry under the purpose prong 
of Lemon . . . is whether the government intends to convey a message 
of endorsement or disapproval of religion.”132  Applying this interpre-
tation of the Lemon test, Justice O’Connor found that the intent of 
having a nativity scene displayed was not to endorse Christianity, but 
to celebrate a “public holiday through its traditional symbols.”133 
The effect prong asks whether, regardless of the government’s ac-
tual purpose, the practice under review in fact conveys a message of 
approval or disapproval of religion.134  As Justice O’Connor explained: 
[T]he effect prong of the Lemon test [does not] require in-
validation of a government practice merely because it in 
fact causes, even as a primary effect, advancement or inhibi-
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 123 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).  
 124 Id. at 687 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 125 Id. at 687-88.  
 126 Id.  
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. at 688. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. at 690. 
 131 Id.  
 132 Id. at 691. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. at 691-92. 
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tion of religion. . . .  What is crucial is that a government 
practice not have the effect of communicating a message of 
government endorsement or disapproval of religion.135 
Justice O’Connor further stated: 
[W]hether a government activity communicates endorse-
ment of religion is not a question of simple historical fact.  
Although evidentiary submissions may help answer it, the 
question is, like the question whether racial or sex-based 
classifications communicate an invidious message, in large 
part a legal question to be answered on the basis of judicial 
interpretation of social facts.136 
Applying this framework to the analysis of the Lynch case, Justice 
O’Connor found that since Christmas is a holiday with “very strong 
secular components and traditions,” and the symbols of the nativity 
scene were displayed with other secular symbols representing the hol-
iday, it did not send a message that government was endorsing Chris-
tianity.137   
The majority of the SCOTUS has essentially adopted Justice 
O’Connor’s interpretation of the Lemon test.138  In County of Alleghe-
ny v. ACLU,139 for example, four justices concurred with Justice 
Blackmun on the validity of Justice O’Connor’s formulation of the 
Lemon test.
140  As in Lynch, however, while a majority of the Justices 
accepted Justice O’Connor’s endorsement standard, there was disa-
greement as to its application, which prevented a majority opinion 
using Justice O’Connor’s test.141   
Justice O’Connor’s framework has gained sufficient popularity 
amongst her peers that, in the words of one scholar, an Establishment 
Clause analysis should be “guided by Justice O’Connor’s Establish-
ment Clause framework and ask if the [same-sex marriage prohibi-
tion] in question was adopted with the purpose of endorsing reli-
gion,”142 paying close attention to McGowan, which stands for the 
premise that a law is not invalid merely because it coincides or har-
monizes with some or all of the tenets of some or all religions.143 
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That Judeo-Christianity condemns homosexuality today, then, is 
not enough to support an Establishment Clause violation, since 
McGowan stands for the premise that a law will not be invalidated 
simply because it happens to harmonize with religious tenets.  The 
issue lies in whether the prohibition was adopted, and continues to 
exist, with the purpose of endorsing religious values or beliefs. 
   
III. SECULAR BASES AND THE SAME-SEX  
MARRIAGE PROHIBITION 
As has been shown, a prohibition of same-sex marriage, on its 
face, appears to be a violation of the Establishment Clause because 
the foundation of the institution of marriage in the United States is 
historically rooted, and thickly clothed, in Judeo-Christian ideals.  
Since same-sex marriage has always been definitionally excluded since 
the Canon law and, as a result, from the common law, the states’ re-
cent statutory enactments against same-sex marriage are simply an 
express codification of already existing law.  Since our common law 
definition of marriage originated from the Canon law and Ecclesias-
tical courts, it is indisputable that the original intent in prohibiting 
same-sex marriage was to promote the interest of Judeo-Christian 
values.  Lemon establishes that a law that is rooted in religion must 
have a valid secular legislative purpose, its primary effect cannot be to 
advance or inhibit religion, and it must not foster an excessive gov-
ernment entanglement with religion.  The Canon law heritage of our 
common law, however, predates the founding of our Nation.  Given 
such extensive passage of time, it could not legitimately be presup-
posed that the states have inherently continued to prohibit same-sex 
marriage for the same reasons for which it was originally definitional-
ly excluded.  The issue turns, at least in part, on whether the states 
have developed a valid secular basis for the prohibition – thus secula-
rizing the prohibition.  
The vast number of bases for prohibiting same-sex marriage that 
have been provided in the marriage statutes, constitutions, and case 
law of the various states, can be categorized as addressing concerns 
dealing with either preserving history and tradition, promoting moral 
values, procreation, protecting the traditional family,144 promoting the 
welfare of children, or promoting a political purpose.  The validity of 
the secular bases is examined through a survey of both legal scholar-
ship and social science (where appropriate). 
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A.  Preserving History and Tradition 
While the core issue presented is that religious dictates lie at the 
foundation of the history and tradition definitionally excluding same-
sex marriage in the United States, preserving this ‘religious history 
and tradition’ cannot stand as a ‘secular’ purpose to prohibiting same-
sex marriage.145  When constitutional rights are at stake, history and 
tradition alone is often not sufficient to uphold a rule of law.  As the 
majority opinion in Lawrence v. Texas146 puts it, “‘[h]istory and tradi-
tion are the starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the 
substantive due process inquiry.’”147   
The Lawrence Court, in addressing whether a Texas sodomy sta-
tute prohibiting same-sex sexual activity was constitutional,148 stated 
that the longstanding history of prohibition against sexual activity be-
tween persons of the same sex was insufficient to allow the statute to 
stand.149  The Court reversed Bowers,150 which held that a Georgia sod-
omy statute did not violate the fundamental rights of homosexuals.151  
In so doing, the Lawrence Court found that the Bowers Court, when 
taking into account the history of sodomy laws, failed to take into ac-
count the “emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protec-
tion to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in 
matters pertaining to sex.”152   
The Court also found that Justice Burger’s “sweeping references . 
. . to the history of Western Civilization and to Judeo-Christian moral 
and ethical standards [in his Bowers concurring opinion] did not take 
account of other authorities pointing in an opposite direction.”153  
Among the ‘other authorities’ referenced by the Lawrence Court are: 
Reports of the British Parliament recommending repeal of laws pu-
                                                                                                                           
 145 One court notes the legislature has often codified history and tradition, but that in each 
such instance a basis beyond general acceptance by society justified the codification.  See In re 
Coordination Proceeding, No. 4365, 2005 WL 583129, at *3. 
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nishing homosexual conduct and a case in the European Court of 
Human Rights which held that laws proscribing homosexual conduct 
were invalid under the European Convention of Human Rights.154  In 
addition, the Court took into account that other nations had taken 
affirmative steps in protecting the rights of homosexuals to engage in 
“intimate, consensual” conduct.155  At the end of the day, the Lawrence 
Court found that the Texas statute proscribing same-sex sexual inti-
macy was unconstitutional.156 
Similarly, a court in California held that history and tradition was 
not enough to support a law prohibiting same-sex marriage.157  Same-
sex couples brought actions to challenge the constitutionality of sta-
tutes limiting marriage to the union of one man and one woman.158  
One of the bases in support of the state law banning same-sex mar-
riage was that opposite-sex marriage has been deeply rooted in Cali-
fornia’s history, culture, and tradition.159  The court rejected this argu-
ment, holding that “same-sex marriage cannot be prohibited solely 
because California has always done so before.”160   
In contrast to the California decision, an Indiana court found his-
tory and tradition were sufficient to uphold the validity of the law 
prohibiting same-sex marriage.161  The court reasoned “restrictions 
against same-sex marriage reinforce, rather than disrupt, the tradi-
tional understanding of marriage as a unique relationship between a 
woman and a man.”162  In its analysis, the Indiana court failed to take 
into account that since the history of marriage is deeply rooted in Ju-
deo-Christian ideals, a state’s interest to preserve the history and tra-
dition of marriage can only serve to preserve the Judeo-Christian 
ideal of marriage as an opposite-sex institution – upon which the pro-
hibition was founded in the first place.  The case, however, was being 
argued under Equal Rights, rather than Establishment Clause, 
grounds.163  As such, that marriage has its roots in Judeo-Christian ide-
ology was not at issue in the case. 
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Under the Establishment Clause jurisprudence’s Lemon test, it 
would seem upholding a statute prohibiting same-sex marriage based 
on history and tradition would be an impermissible entanglement of 
Church and State because the historical Canonical purpose for the 
prohibition is not secular.  In the absence of any other valid state pur-
pose to continue the prohibition of same-sex marriage besides history 
and tradition, the prohibition of same-sex marriage arguably remains 
rooted in the religious Canon law that founded it as an opposite-sex 
institution.  Therefore, it would violate the Establishment Clause un-
der the original Lemon test, since the original Canonical purpose for 
excluding same-sex marriage definitionally was rooted in the religious 
values of the Judeo-Christian faith.  It would also violate the Estab-
lishment Clause under Justice O’Connor’s framework, because the 
intent of the framers of the Canon laws was to promote the religious 
interests of traditional Judeo-Christianity.  On this basis, it would ap-
pear history and tradition inherently cannot stand as the sole basis for 
a prohibition of same-sex marriages. 
There are, however, secular schools of thought that argue the pre-
servation of history and tradition for the benefit of society.  These are 
discussed below. 
1. Burke and Oakeshott – conservative thinkers 
In a symposium on the meaning of marriage, Amy Wax discussed 
the traditionalist conservative and rationalist liberal views on the issue 
of preserving history and tradition.164  Wax posits the scholarly litera-
ture that makes a serious effort to formulate an argument against 
same-sex marriage is scarce.165  And, what is written lacks a unified and 
systematic exposition of the anti-gay marriage position.166  As a result 
of this scarcity, Wax looks to thinkers identified with conservative 
views on politics and social life and draws on these works to explore 
whether these conservative theories provide any guidance on the 
question whether marriage should include same-sex marriages.167 
According to Burke, a conservative thinker, traditional institu-
tions and customary practices represent experience embodied as wis-
dom.168  These traditions are presumed to be good or useful to society.169  
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And, since no one can accurately predict the outcome of any human 
plan, Burke warns that reliance on “formal learning” and “individual 
reason” is “far more prone to error and unintended consequences” 
than reliance on the accumulated wisdom embodied in customs, tradi-
tions, and settled practices.170  These themes of reliance on collective 
wisdom, rather than on formal learning and individual reason, are also 
prominent in the works of Michael Oakeshott.171   
Argument, analysis, and criticism of social practices are not re-
jected by Burke and Oakeshott, however.172  Rather, they see institu-
tional change as a part of social and economic life which cannot be 
avoided.173  Burke believes change, when properly guided, can be a 
source of renewal.174  The notion that customs and traditions represent 
experience embodied as wisdom is in conflict with the notion that in-
stitutional change is inevitable.175  Evolutionary social changes that 
occur naturally and become self-executing as they gain popular sup-
port, however, are distinguished from legal reforms – which are im-
posed deliberately and consciously.176   
Based on this, Burke’s school of thought would advocate that leg-
islative change should only be the result of “generally felt need.”177  
Moreover, such a need for change would only warrant respect if it was 
the felt need of a conservative with adherence to tradition, since they 
lack eagerness to change.178  “‘Tradition . . . [in Burke’s thinking] isn’t 
the enemy of change. . . . Political institutions require ongoing reform . 
. . [but change should] take the form of scrutinizing existing problems 
and canvassing available solutions, not trying to redesign things from 
scratch.’”179   
In asking how this applies to answering whether same-sex mar-
riages should be allowed, Wax recognizes that these conservative ideas 
are complicated by the role of religion in the politics of same-sex mar-
riage.180  The conservative views of Burke and Oakeshott are primarily 
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 170 Id. at 1066-67. 
 171 Id. at 1067. 
 172 Id. at 1069. 
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 175 Id. at 1070. 
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. at 1070 n.33 (quoting RUSSELL KIRK, THE CONSERVATIVE MIND: FROM BURKE TO 
SANTAYANA 40 (1953)). 
 178 Wax, supra note 164, at 1070. 
 179 See id. at 1069 n.32 (quoting Don Herzog, Puzzling Through Burke, 19 POL. THEORY 
336, 344 (1991)). 
 180 Wax, supra note 164, at 1073. 
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secular.181  In an apparent recognition of the separation of Church and 
State, Wax notes that “[i]f faith-based convictions are a major factor, 
the theorists’ ideas may not matter much.”182  That these conservative 
secular views simply happen to coincide with religious outlook, how-
ever, does not rule out their secular validity.   
In contrast with conservative thought, liberal thought abandons 
history and looks to principle.183  Principles of equality, nondiscrimina-
tion, and rights are predominant themes.184  Strengthening these argu-
ments is the fact that gender and sexual preference are immutable or 
deeply engrained.185  Liberal thinkers approach the same-sex marriage 
issue from a presumption of equality and demand rational, logical rea-
sons for denying equality.186  As such, the focus of the liberal thinker 
focuses on logical inconsistencies of the conservative’s position.187   
This plays out in the California and Indiana cases discussed 
above.  The California (liberal) court said that the state cannot deny 
same-sex marriage simply because it had done so in the past,188 and the 
Indiana (conservative) court said that denying same-sex marriage only 
served to reinforce the traditional definition of marriage as an oppo-
site-sex institution.189 
2. Traditionalists v. Rationalists 
In the same symposium on the meaning of marriage, Gail Heriot 
seems to expand on the discussion of the conservative versus the lib-
eral thinker.  Framing the conservative thinker as a Traditionalist and 
the liberal thinker as a Rationalist.190  Traditionalists and Rationalists 
are not real individuals.191  Rather, they are “types . . . [that] help ex-
plain some of the legal and policy debates . . . .”192 
Traditionalists and Rationalist often “butt heads,” Heriot ex-
plains.193  Rationalists are often baffled at the Traditionalists’ “irration-
al fondness for established practice.”194  Meanwhile, Traditionalists see 
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 189 See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text.  
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the Rationalists’ confidence in “the superiority of [the] intellect over 
the collective wisdom of the ages [as] irrational.”195  This gap, Heriot 
explains, is often unbridgeable,196 and the issue of same-sex marriage 
may be such an area where the gap cannot be bridged.197  These views 
are discussed below in light of the polar views on the same-sex mar-
riage issue.  
The Rationalist wants proof that a break in the traditional defini-
tion of marriage as being between opposite-sex parties, as opposed to 
same-sex parties, would have a detrimental effect on society.198  The 
Traditionalist wants proof that a break in the traditional definition of 
marriage as being between opposite-sex parties, as opposed to same-
sex parties, will not have a detrimental effect on society.199  Rationalists 
are zealous and can make progress but are unprotected by the mod-
erating influence of tradition.200  In the field of academia, the zealous 
Rationalist is incapable of doing much harm or good except insofar as 
his ideas are persuasive.201  But a judge’s professional merits are differ-
ent than that of an academic.202  A judge’s decisions affect real persons, 
living real lives, in very real ways.203  Therefore, Heriot argues, judicial 
decision-making must be cautious and conservative.204  This is why le-
gal traditionalism has been the rule of our courts, as is well exempli-
fied by the principle of stare decisis – which calls for judicial decision-
making based on legal precedent.205   
Arguably then, traditionalism belongs in the courts and rational-
ism may be better left to the legislature.
 206  Since a majority is required 
to change a rule of law, there is inherently more protection from er-
ror.207  This underlies the argument against judicial activism.208  What if 
the issue is the constitutionality of a statute?  “[C]ourts . . . are in their 
most rationalist mode . . . usually [when] deciding issues of constitu-
tional law.”209  
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3. History and tradition as a valid basis 
Both Wax and Heriot’s papers advance a plausible secular argu-
ment for the proposition that preserving history and tradition could 
promote a valid state interest.  However, while Wax slightly brushed 
on the notion that the religious political aspect of same-sex marriage 
could invalidate the conservative theorists’ positions, neither of them 
truly addressed the Establishment Clause issues surrounding the pro-
hibition of same-sex marriage.  As Wax brushed on, however, since 
marriage is a fundamental right,210 the exclusion of same-sex couples 
solely on the basis of ‘because they have always been,’ should not 
stand.  To paraphrase the Lawrence Court, history and tradition 
should be the starting point but not the ending point of the Estab-
lishment Clause inquiry.211 
B.  Promoting Moral Values 
To prohibit same-sex marriage in order to promote moral values 
implies one of two things:  that same-sex couples are inherently im-
moral or that they do not share the moral values equivalent to that of 
opposite-sex couples. 
1. Moral values after Romer and Lawrence 
The Supreme Court, in Romer212 and Lawrence,213 “rejected moral 
disapproval, without more, as a basis for subjecting gay214 citizens to 
selectively disfavored treatment.”215  In a concurrence in Lawrence, 
Justice O’Connor expressly added, “moral disapproval, without any 
other asserted state interest, is [not] a sufficient rationale . . . to justify 
a law that discriminates among groups of persons.”216  Based on these 
Court rulings, the basis for promoting moral values must then lie on 
ground other than the belief that same-sex marriage is inherently im-
moral.  Therefore, an expression of moral disapproval that is unsup-
                                                                                                                           
 210 See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (“[T]he right to marry is part of the 
fundamental right to privacy . . . .”). 
 211 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572.  
 212 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 213 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  
 214 The term “gay” throughout this paper refers to same-sex couples, either male-male or 
female-female. 
 215 Tobias Barrington Wolff, Interest Analysis in Interjurisdictional Marriage Disputes, 153 U. 
PA. L. REV. 2215, 2216-17 (2005) (relying on the Lawrence majority).  See also Morrison v. Sadler, 
821 N.E. 2d 15, 20 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (state concedes that “Lawrence effectively forecloses the 
possibility of relying upon moral disapproval of homosexual relationships as the sole justification 
for limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples only.”). 
 216 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 582 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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ported by a further explanation of the state’s interest is no longer a 
proper basis for prohibiting same-sex marriage, since a prohibition 
based on promoting moral values must go beyond a judgment of the 
same-sex relationship itself.217  
2. Moral values as a valid basis 
Historically, sodomy statutes have always sought to condemn 
non-procreative sex.218  The idea that sex is for reproduction, and 
therefore sex for pleasure is wrong, is a reproductive logic that “capi-
talizes on traditional Judeo-Christian morality.”219  This ideology places 
same-sex sexual practices,220 and inherently same-sex relationships, as 
subjects of constant moral judgment.  This does not imply that a given 
state’s same-sex marriage prohibition based on the ‘promotion of 
moral values’ is religious in nature, however.   
A reading of the state’s bases aiming to promote moral values 
seem to imply a general belief that traditional families have “inhe-
rent”221 moral values, unique “moral imperatives,”222 provide a “basic 
morality” to society,223 provide a unique “moral statement to the com-
                                                                                                                           
 217 Wolff, supra note 215, at 2232-33.  
 218 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 559-60 (recognizing the criminalization of non-procreative sex 
through sodomy statutes).   
 219 Herdt, supra note 104, at 29; Christensen v. State, 468 S.E. 2d 188, 189-95 (Ga. 1996) 
(Georgia judge, in a pre-Lawrence dissent where a man was seeking a “blow job,” expressly 
opposed the state’s proposition that the statute should be upheld because “such acts were pro-
scribed by Judeo-Christian values, and were punishable during the Middle Ages and Reforma-
tion,” because it would be improper that a minority groups’ rights should be dependent on majo-
ritarian approval where no public harm would result from granting the minority group their right 
to privacy).  
 220 “Gay sex” refers to sex between persons of the same sex, for the purposes of this paper.  
 221 See, e.g., 19-A-2 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 23-I, § 650 (1) (A) and (2) (West, Westlaw through 
2005 First Reg. Sess. of 122d Legis. and with emergency legislation through the 2005 First Spec. 
Sess. of 122d Legis.) (declares the compelling state interest to “nurture and promote the unique 
institution of monogamous traditional marriage in the support of harmonious families and the 
physical and mental health of children,” and to “promot[e] the moral values inherent in tradi-
tional monogamous families,” and the purposes of the statute as: “A. To encourage the tradition-
al monogamous family unit as the basic building block of our society, the foundation of harmo-
nious and enriching family life; B. To nurture, sustain and protect the traditional monogamous 
family unit in Maine society, its moral imperatives, its economic function and its unique contribu-
tion to the rearing of healthy children; and C. To support and strengthen traditional monogam-
ous Maine families against improper interference from out-of-state influences or edicts.”). 
 222 Id.  
 223 See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 765.001 (1) (2) (West, Westlaw through 2005 Act 21, published 
7/22/05) (“It is the intent . . . to promote the stability and best interests of marriage and the fami-
ly. . . . [T]o recognize the valuable contributions of both spouses during the marriage and at ter-
mination of the marriage . . . .  [It] . . . is the foundation of the family and of society.  Its stability is 
basic to morality and civilization, and of vital interest to society and the state.”). 
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munity,”224 foster “virtue” and “purity of the home” that promote “mo-
rality.”225  Underlying these bases for prohibiting same-sex marriage is 
the implication that a non-traditional family headed by same-gender 
parents would lack inherent moral values, lack moral imperatives, lack 
basic morality, fail to provide a statement of morality to the communi-
ty, fail to foster virtue, and fail to foster purity in the home.   
The social science literature on morality as a basis to prohibit 
same-sex marriage is scarce.  One family counselor, however, in an 
article opposing same-sex marriage, writes “heterosexual couples 
teach and model sound morals to children . . . .  These morals include 
truthfulness, respect for others, commitment, perseverance, kindness, 
committed long-term sexuality, self-control, and others.”226  Implied in 
this statement is that same-sex couples lack such moral values.  How-
ever, there is no scientific or scholarly support offered in that article to 
support the premise that same-sex couples lack such values.   
Another scholar suggests that such implications are inherently 
non-secular when he notes that Romer and Lawrence forbid the state 
to prohibit same-sex marriage by “dressing” the state’s basis for the 
prohibition in “lay clothing” – the justification for prohibiting same-
sex marriage “must be both secular and concrete.”227 
A review of the statutes and the case law using the promotion of 
moral values as their underlying rationales fails to explain how same-
sex marriage would undermine these moral values.228  What is revealed 
in some of the case law, which discusses moral values as a basis for the 
prohibition, is an attitude of moral judgment that same-sex sexual 
practices are inherently immoral and thus same-sex marriage is moral-
ly wrong.229   
                                                                                                                           
 224 See, e.g., Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P. 2d 44, 52 (Haw. 1993) (listing one of the state’s basis as a 
‘statement of moral values to the community’). 
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sex sexual practices an “abominable crime against nature,” viewing it as “errant sexual behavior 
which threatens the fabric of society”); Hyche Landfill, LLC v. Winston County, 878 So. 2d 258, 
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Political moralists and religious fundamentalists confuse and 
lump together the nineteenth-century homosexuals to the twentieth-
century lesbians or gay men.230  There is an important distinction be-
tween the two.231  The nineteenth century homosexual, forced to live 
hidden from society, could not lead a normal life.232  Twentieth-century 
gays and lesbians, however, are able to live more open and fully, and 
can live normal social lives.233  This change becomes evident when one 
looks at the onslaught of cases nationwide that are filed by same-sex 
couples in an effort to obtain the right to legally enter into civil mar-
riage. 
Failing to distinguish this evolution in the social lives of gays and 
lesbians, political moralists make policy based on the stereotype that 
all gays and lesbians, unless laws control them, are hypersexual and 
unable to control their sexual desires.
 234  Statements made by Senators 
in support of the federal DOMA235 further illustrate the pervasiveness 
of the belief amongst some lawmakers that same-sex sexual practices 
are inherently immoral and against ‘natural law,’ based on religious 
ideology.236  And, as recently as 2002 and 2004, judges speaking from 
the bench – as gatekeepers of the law – have referred to same-sex 
sexual practices and gay persons as “abhorrent, immoral, detestable, a 
crime against nature, and a violation of the laws of nature,” destruc-
tive to society, and belonging in mental institutions – all based on reli-
gious moral beliefs.237  
                                                                                                                           
272-76  (Ala. 2003) (stating political, cultural, religious, and legal beliefs- all of which are rooted 
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 236 The natural law argument is based on the belief that same-sex sexual practices are unna-
tural and relies strictly on the doctrine of morality as its basis.  See John G. Culhane, Uprooting 
the Arguments Against Same-Sex Marriage, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 1119, 1198-00 (1999).  
 237 See cases cited supra note 57.  See also Herdt, supra note 104 (“The most destructive 
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In fact, as evidenced by the gay community‘s nationwide efforts 
to legalize same-sex marriage, same-sex couples desire to enter into 
marriage-like238 relationships and to share the moral values that are 
traditionally associated with marriage.239  Gay couples who enter into 
marriage-like relationships do so with what are “very traditional con-
cepts of the nature of the relationship.”240  Gays and lesbians share in 
the same culture as everyone else, and also want gold bands, legal 
documents, and kids.241  These facts do not support that same-sex 
households lack in morals, but rather that they embrace the same 
moral values for family life as their heterosexual counterpart.  Even if 
they did not, however, Romer and Lawrence would require more than 
mere moral disapproval to sustain a same-sex marriage prohibition.242  
If the morality underlying a rule of law is purely secular and 
merely coincides with religious tenets then, perhaps, it would pass Es-
tablishment Clause muster.  However, statements such as the ones 
made in the Congress when passing DOMA and statements such as 
the ones made from the bench, openly denouncing homosexual rela-
tionships as being immoral based on religious credence, bring into 
question the secular validity of the resulting laws and rulings from 
these legislators and judges.  Such an imposition of their moral majori-
ty upon the homosexual minority is exactly the type of religious impo-
sition the Establishment Clause seeks to prevent. 
                                                                                                                           
Historically, same-sex sexual practices were seen as deviant, a sin, and a form of mental ill-
ness.  PAULINE IRIT ERERA, FAMILY DIVERSITY 161 (2002).  “Gay men and lesbians have been 
burned, beheaded, institutionalized, subjected to lobotomy and electroshock treatment, and 
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 240 See Sparling, supra note 239.   
 241 Wolfson, supra note 239, at 583. 
 242 See Wolff, supra note 215 and accompanying text. 
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C.  Procreation243 
The procreation theory sees traditional marriage as the basic so-
cial fabric of society.244  It is most often rooted in the premise that pro-
creation promotes the continuity of the human race.245  Some states 
promote procreation as it relates to child rearing as a rational basis 
because it promotes the presence of both biological parents.246  Scho-
lars recognize that, on their face, these arguments appear valid be-
cause it is undeniable that procreation is fundamental to the survival 
of the human race,247 and it is also irrefutable that same-sex couples 
cannot procreate together.248  Many courts upholding procreation as a 
valid basis for prohibiting same-sex marriage have reasoned that limit-
ing marriage to those relationships capable of producing children is a 
reasonable restriction.249   
                                                                                                                           
 243 Since some states relate procreation to child welfare, it should be noted that whether the 
welfare of children is at risk when raised by a same-sex couple will be discussed in the “Promot-
ing the Welfare of Children” section below.  This section concerns itself with the primary argu-
ment that procreation is needed for the continuity of the race and that since same-sex couples 
inherently cannot procreate their marriage does not fulfill the state’s interest in promoting pro-
creation. 
 244 See, e.g., Knight v. Schwarzenegger, Nos. 03AS05284, 2004 WL 2011407, at *6 (marriage is 
the “keystone of civilized society . . . [whose] interest [is] to maintain . . . marriage for . . . societal 
goals ranging from property rights to procreation”).  See also supra note 57.  
 245 See, e.g., Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1308 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (“foster development 
of relationships optimal for procreation, thereby encouraging the ‘stable generational continuity 
of the United States’” and “encouraging creation of stable relationships that facilitate the rear-
ing of children by both their biological parents” as bases for the federal DOMA law in a lawsuit 
by two lesbians married in Massachusetts).  See also supra note 57. 
 246 See, e.g., Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 865 (Vt. 1999) (stated “furthering the link 
between procreation and child rearing”).  See also supra note 57. 
 247 See Note, The Legality of Homosexual Marriage, 82 YALE L.J. 573, 587 (1972-1973) 
[hereinafter Legality of Homosexual Marriage] (recognizing same-sex couples cannot procreate 
together).  See also  Dale Carpenter, Draft, Bad Arguments Against Gay Marriage, Law & Socie-
ty Abstracts, vol. I, No. 33, Nov. 18, 2005, at 20, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=832008) 
(“[G]ay couples, note procreationists, cannot procreate as a couple.”). 
 248 See Note, supra note 247, at 587.  See also, Carpenter, supra note 247. 
 249 See, e.g., Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451, 461 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004) (Gemmill, J. 
and Portley. M., concurring) (“State’s interest . . . limited to those capable of producing children . 
. . .”); Dean. v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 333 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (permitting limitation to 
opposite-sex couples because of emphasis on child bearing); Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 
1308 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (permitting denial of same-sex marriage based on interest of procreation 
to foster generational continuity); Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *3 (fostering 
interest of procreation within marital setting allowed to prohibit same-sex marriage); Baker v. 
Nelson, 191 N.W. 2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971) (fostering procreation for the rearing of children 
within the family setting); Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259, 272-76 n.4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 2005) 
(recognizing the unique procreative quality of male and female bonding); Lewis v. Harris, No. 
MER-L-15-03, 2003 WL 23191114, at *13 (traditional marriage uniquely fosters procreation); 
People v. Greenleaf, 780 N.Y.S. 2d 899 (N.Y. J. Ct. 2004) (traditional marriage provides favorable 
environment for procreation); Constant v. Paul, 496 A.2d 1, 6 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (implies pro-
creation when stating that traditional marriage promotes propagation of the human race); Baker 
v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 865 (Vt. 1999) (based on link between procreation and child rearing).  
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A variant of the procreation rationale frames procreation within 
the marital setting as “responsible procreation.”250  The term “respon-
sible procreation” is defined as “the procreation and raising of child-
ren by persons who have contemplated, and are well suited for, the 
required commitment and challenges of child rearing,”251 implying that 
same-sex couples fail to contemplate, and are not suited for the chal-
lenges of child rearing. 
This idea, that procreation is a fundamental purpose of marriage, 
is deeply rooted in Judeo-Christian ideals.252  Canon 1096 of the Code 
of Canon law specifically provided that marriage between a man and 
woman was organized for the procreation of children by sexual coop-
eration.253  “The history of the law of marriage in this country traces its 
origins back to the ancient Canon law.”254  Thus, the idea that marriage 
is for the fundamental purpose of procreation is an ideal that is rooted 
in Judeo-Christian values in the United States.  As such, procreation as 
an element of marriage was once regulated insofar as our original 
sodomy laws aimed to prosecute any non-procreative sexual activity.255   
The courts are split on whether procreation is a valid state pur-
pose to support a same-sex marriage prohibition.  For example, the 
Superior Court of San Francisco, addressing procreation as a state 
purpose for marriage, said that one does not:  
have to be married in order to procreate, nor does one have 
to procreate in order to be married. . . .  [M]arriage is avail-
able to heterosexual couples regardless of whether they can 
or want to procreate. . . .  Given this situation, one cannot 
conclude that singling out the same-sex couple classification 
                                                                                                                           
 250 See Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E. 2d 15, 25 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (fostering interest in “re-
sponsible procreation”). 
 251 Id. at 25 n.13.  
 252 Claudina Richards, Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Couples – the French Perspective, 51 
Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 305, 308 (2002).  
 253 Id. 
 254 Ramon v. Ramon, 34 N.Y.S. 2d 100, 108 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1942) (quoting Reaves v. Reaves, 
82 P. 490, 494 (Okla. 1905)).  See also Gary Chamberlain, A Religious Argument for Same-Sex 
Marriage, 2 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 495, 500 (2004) (Vatican believes procreation is one of the 
main purposes for marriage). 
 255 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 559 (“Early American sodomy laws were not directed at homo-
sexuals as such but instead sought to prohibit nonprocreative sexual activity more generally, 
whether between men and women or men and men.”).  Non-procreative sexual activity was 
defined as any sex other than male-female penis to vagina sex.  That the couple be able to pro-
create was not at issue under the sodomy laws.  Only that the form of sex had to have the ability 
to cause procreation in a fertile couple was at issue. 
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of non-child-bearers is necessary to any perceived govern-
ment interest in allowing marriage to further procreation.
 256 
Contrast this court’s decision on procreation with the following 
decision from an older case in a California United States District 
Court: 
[T]he main justification in this age for societal recognition 
and protection of the institution of marriage is procreation, 
perpetuation of the race.  Plaintiffs argue that some persons 
are allowed to marry . . . even though the above stated justi-
fication procreation is not possible.  They point to marriages 
being sanctioned between couples who are sterile because 
of age or physical infirmity, and between couples who make 
clear they have chosen not to have children. . . .  [I]f the clas-
sification of the group who may marry is overinclusive, it 
does not affect the validity of the classification. . . . [T]he 
state has a compelling interest in encouraging and fostering 
procreation of the race . . . there is no real alternative to 
overbreadth . . . . The alternative would be to require each 
couple, before issuing a marriage license, as to their plans 
for children and give sterility tests to all applicants . . . .257 
Interestingly, both of these cases applied a strict scrutiny standard 
in their analysis. Legal scholars continue to be split on the issue.  Be-
low are discussions on these two polar views. 
1. Why procreation is a bad argument 
Proponents of same-sex marriage argue the procreation basis is a 
bad argument against same-sex marriage.258  Through means such as 
artificial insemination and surrogacy, same-sex couples – either male 
or female – are able to procreate and form a family in much the same 
manner as many heterosexual couples procreate and form families.259  
In fact, heterosexual insemination has gained such acceptance as a 
method of reproduction that most jurisdictions recognize the spouse 
of an inseminated mother as the “real” father and deny parental rights 
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to the donor.260  New reproductive technologies, such as artificial inse-
mination and surrogacy through in vitro fertilization, have expanded 
the traditional undertaking of families to include non-biological fami-
ly members as “real” family members.261  “Families formed through 
reproductive technologies, similar to adoptive-foster families, and to 
some extent like stepfamilies, defy the notion that biological concep-
tion has to be the basis for family formation.”262   
Legal scholar Mark Strasser notes the SCOTUS has linked mar-
riage to procreation.263  In Board of Directors, the Court expressly rec-
ognized “marriage, begetting and bearing children, child rearing and 
education, and cohabitation with relatives” are intimate relationships 
that are constitutionally protected.264  The Court explicitly rejected, 
however, that only those relationships implicating familial associations 
would be constitutionally protected265 so that procreation, then, is a 
protected right even outside the scope of marital relations.  Strasser 
posits that not allowing same-sex couples to marry may in fact deter 
same-sex couples from procreating, thus “to use it as a reason to pro-
hibit such unions is to turn the rationale on its head.”266   
In another case, Turner,267 the Court decided whether an inmate 
had a right to marry while in prison.268  Strasser emphasizes that the 
Court upheld the inmate’s right to marry because marriages express 
moral support and public commitment, marriages may involve the 
exercise of faith and personal commitment, marriages are formed in 
the hopes they will be consummated, and marriages are often a pre-
condition to government benefits:269 none of the reasons enumerated 
by the Supreme Court framed the fundamental right of marriage as 
being dependent upon procreation.270   
In the past, the Supreme Court has supported the notion that 
procreation is fundamental to the very existence of the human race.271  
In spite of this history, Justice Scalia effectively rebutted the procrea-
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tion argument as an adequate basis for prohibiting same-sex mar-
riage.272  In Lawrence, Scalia wrote: 
[W]hat justification could there possibly be for denying the 
benefits of marriage to homosexual couples exercising “the 
liberty protected by the Constitution”?  Surely not the en-
couragement of procreation, since the sterile and the elderly 
are allowed to marry.273 
Whereas sex was once a prerequisite to procreation, this is no 
longer so in light of technological advances.  Given the widespread 
acceptance and use of technology to procreate, whether traditional 
marriage for the purpose of procreation continues to be the basic fa-
bric of society is negligible. The procreation argument appears logical-
ly flawed in light of the fact that one does not need to procreate to get 
married, that one does not have to get married to procreate, and that 
same-sex couples are able to procreate through the use of alternative 
methods of conception.274  
The argument for procreation is further weakened by the fact 
that only sixteen percent of married couples see having children as the 
main purpose for marriage, notes one sociologist.275  As a result of the 
weakening social norms that have traditionally defined partner’s roles 
and behaviors, the meaning of marriage has evolved over the years.276  
As marriage evolved, so did the laws regarding marriage.277  Under this 
view, that same-sex couples are seeking to marry can be seen as the 
natural result of the weakening of social norms and the ongoing gra-
dual deinstitutionalization of traditional marriage.278   
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2. Why procreation is a good argument 
Some believe that reproductive technologies do not counter the 
validity of procreation as a rational basis for prohibiting same-sex 
marriage.279  Rather, one view sees it as undermining the ‘family’280 be-
cause it results in anonymous fatherhood,281 exploits children – be-
cause it “remov[es] procreation from the context of loving, marital 
intercourse,”282 allows lesbians and single women to have children of 
their own – affronting the ‘traditional family’ and moral standards of 
marriage.283  
Some opponents of same-sex marriage argue that while same-sex 
couple may be able to procreate through alternate means, they are 
unable to procreate together by definition.284  Only heterosexual 
couples are able to have biological children.285  This is seen as the “pro-
creative ideal.”286  Therefore, if same-sex couples were allowed to mar-
ry, then many couples would “fall short of the procreative ideal.”287  
Proponents of same-sex marriage argue the inconsistency of procrea-
tion being the primary purpose of marriage in light of the fact that 
many heterosexual couples are allowed to marry who cannot, or do 
not want to, procreate.288   
Opponents, however, make the distinction that barrenness is the 
exception for the heterosexual couple, whereas inability to procreate 
together is the rule for homosexual couples.289  This does not imply per 
se that same-sex couples are barren and unable to have children, but 
rather that they are unable to have children together.290  This distinc-
tion is deemed critical on the basis that parents tend to treat their nat-
ural children better than their adopted children.291   
That opposite-sex marriage is the “optimum arrangement” for 
procreation should not imply that every heterosexual couple must 
achieve procreation.292  Because same-sex couples are unable to 
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achieve the ideal of procreation per se, traditionalist ideology advo-
cates that allowing same-sex couples to marry may have undesirable 
effects – which could only be known after the reforms have taken 
place – on the real-world institution of marriage.293 
3. Procreation as a valid secular basis 
The traditionalist view advances one of the strongest arguments 
in regards to procreation, namely, that the social repercussions of lega-
lizing same-sex marriage are unpredictable.  To bar same-sex marriage 
because it cannot provide what some see as the optimum setting for 
procreation is not very likely to pass muster at the SCOTUS, however, 
when Justice Scalia – one of the most conservative Justices on the 
Court – has already refuted it as a valid basis to prohibit same-sex 
marriage.   
The question would most likely turn on whether possible and un-
predictable social repercussions regarding procreation are sufficient to 
preserve the state’s interest in keeping marriage an opposite-sex insti-
tution.  This position loses strength in light of the fact that only sixteen 
percent of married couples see procreation as the main purpose to 
marriage.294  This, however, does not necessarily imply that only sixteen 
percent of married couples are procreating.   
In 1978, only one out of six children were born outside of mar-
riage.295  However, by 2003, this had increased to one of three children 
being born outside marriage.296  This is attributed, in part, to the in-
crease in cohabitation, which has become an increasingly accepted 
alternative to marriage, especially among lower income households.297  
Given the decrease in marital births by fifty percent in the last twenty-
seven years, it is hard to imagine that denying same-sex marriages 
would serve the state’s interest of ‘procreation within marriage.’  This 
procreation argument is negligible at best and should fail to substan-
tiate a valid ground upon which to continue denying same-sex mar-
riage on its own merits.  
                                                                                                                           
 293 Wax, supra note 164, at 1080. 
 294 Cherlin, supra note 275, at 856.  
 295 Id. at 849. 
 296 Id. 
 297 Id. at 849-50. 
2007] The Same-Sex Marriage Prohibition 155 
D.  Protecting the Traditional Family298 
That at least thirty-seven states have passed defense of marriage 
laws to prohibit same-sex marriage in their respective states implies 
that same-sex marriage is seen by these states as a threat to the insti-
tution of marriage.  There are divergent viewpoints regarding what 
same-sex marriage would mean to the family. 
1. The family as transitioning 
One viewpoint sees the family not as under attack, but as transi-
tioning.299  In the eyes of this viewpoint, family analysts are too quick 
to see the family as being in decline.300  One sociologist, Orthner, as-
serts “fundamental values, such as caring for children and the impor-
tance of kinship, have not changed.”301  Orthner proposes, rather, what 
is changing is the way people choose to live with each other.302   
It is generally agreed upon that transition has been occurring for 
years in the traditional family.303  The American family has been in 
transition “as long as there have been American families.”304  Sociolo-
gists have recognized the shifts in family patterns since at least the 
1930’s.305  Examples of the shift in family patterns include: rising di-
vorce rates, women entering the labor force, and more children being 
left at daycare.306  Where there has been less agreement is on the 
meaning of these changes.307  Is the family falling apart or reorganiz-
ing?  Are we seeing institutional decline or change?  Are family values 
no longer important or have new beliefs and values begun to replace 
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outdated ones?  Such questions are reflective of the split between the 
conservative and liberal legal scholars. 
Same-sex couples have gained the ability to live more open and 
fuller lives than ever.
 
  Having attained this, same-sex couples desire to 
share in the traditional values, rewards, benefits, and fulfillment that 
married family life brings.308  Granting recognition to same-sex couples 
in marriage, then, would only be another step in the continuing transi-
tion of family and be reflective of the fact that the concept of family is 
subject to widespread social change.309  
Traditional institutions and customs normally reflect the human 
experience that accumulates over generations.310  As a result, what is 
considered ‘traditional’ evolves over time.311  As Orthner points out, 
however, “[w]henever social institutions shift their functions and 
structure, the usual perception is of decay.”312   
2. The traditional family as obsolete 
Another viewpoint contends that the traditional family is obso-
lete.313  This viewpoint challenges those who idealize the “traditional” 
nuclear family.314  It is argued that while the traditional family worked 
well a century ago, it no longer works in light of people living much 
longer than they used to, the ease of divorces, and the increased mo-
bility of modern life.315  This view recognizes that the religious values 
driving the notion that relationships should be “‘til death do us part” 
are in collision with the notion that shorter relationships are heal-
thier.316  Even with a return to “traditional values” the divorce rate has 
remained constant.317  As of 1992, the nuclear family had not become 
any more successful, maintaining a constant divorce rate of one in two 
marriages.318   
Acknowledging the pre-existing troubles of the traditional family, 
this viewpoint does not support the notion that same-sex marriage 
threatens traditional marriage.  Rather, it reinforces that the institu-
tion of marriage has been subject to social change, making the “tradi-
                                                                                                                           
 308 Sparling, supra note 239, at 188-89. 
 309 Orthner, supra note 299, at 26-27. 
 310 Wax, supra note 164, at 1066. 
 311 Id. 
 312 Orthner, supra note 299, at 28. 
 313 Diane Fassel, The Traditional Family is Obsolete, in FAMILY IN AMERICA: OPPOSING 
VIEWPOINTS 25, 33-39 (David L. Bender & Bruno Leone eds., 1992). 
 314 Id. at 33. 
 315 Id. 
 316 Id. at 34. 
 317 Id. 
 318 Id. 
2007] The Same-Sex Marriage Prohibition 157 
tional” marriage more of an ideal than a reality.  Under this view, 
same-sex marriage could not possibly be a threat to the tradition and 
history of marriage because marriage, as we know it today, is already 
evolved away from what marriage used to be.  
3. Protecting the traditional family as a valid basis 
It is well established that social forces have impacted the institu-
tion of traditional marriage over the years, forcing a transition and 
evolution of the family.  But one has to search long and hard for litera-
ture discussing ‘protecting the traditional family,’ because this argu-
ment is rarely advanced on its own merit.  Rather, it latches on to oth-
er purposes.  For example, in Maine, the purpose of the marriage sta-
tute is to preserve the traditional family for “support of harmonious 
families and the physical and mental health of children . . . nurture, 
sustain and protect the traditional monogamous family unit in Maine 
society, its moral imperatives, its economic function and its unique 
contribution to the rearing of healthy children.”319 In this example, the 
preservation of the traditional family provides a foundation for estab-
lishing moral imperatives, economic functions, and a setting for raising 
healthy children.   
Similarly, in a Florida case, the purpose of maintaining traditional 
marriage was to “encourag[e] [the] creation of stable relationships 
that facilitate the rearing of children by both their biological par-
ents.”320  In this case, preserving the traditional family is the foundation 
for what is perceived to be the type of stable relationship that can faci-
litate child rearing by both biological parents.  The validity of protect-
ing the traditional family as a basis to prohibit same-sex marriage, 
then, fully depends on the validity of the premise for which the tradi-
tional family serves as a foundation. 
Perhaps the traditionalist conservative argument for protecting 
the traditional family by not allowing same-sex marriage is the closest 
this basis gets to standing on its own merits.  The traditionalist view is 
rooted in the fear of uncertainty.321  Traditionalist conservatives “warn 
that sanctioning same-sex marriage will inevitably lead to the legaliza-
tion of other suspect forms of conduct, including polygamy, group 
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marriage, incest, and bestiality.”322  The argument is that legalizing 
same-sex marriage will act as a “slippery slope,” which will in turn 
lead to socially undesirable forms of marriage.323  The essence of the 
slippery slope argument is that “if we allow gay marriage, we’ll have to 
allow [policy X] that would unquestionably be bad.”324  The traditional-
ist conservative view essentially promotes staying with the traditional 
family definition to serve the purpose of harm avoidance.   
This is an appealing argument because it looks like gays are not 
being attacked since the purpose is not to inhibit gay rights, but to 
prevent social harms.325  The slippery slope argument is an argument of 
last resort that is used when other arguments have failed.326  For exam-
ple, a last ditch effort argument could be made that proponents of po-
lygamy would piggyback on the same-sex marriage legalization by 
analogy.327  An equally plausible argument, however, could be made 
that while legalizing same-sex marriage “liberalize[s] a marriage en-
trance rule . . . it is not necessarily a call to open marriage to anyone 
and everyone anymore than the fight against antimiscegenation laws 
was a call to open marriage to anyone and everyone.”328  Logically, 
there is no reason allowing a new form of monogamous marriage 
should lead to the legalization of polygamous marriage.329   
In sum, the slippery slope argument is weak at best.  It is a last 
resort argument that relies on the unknown to substantiate its pre-
mise.  In light of the fact that protecting the traditional family all these 
years has not improved the traditional family, nor made it more suc-
cessful,330 this basis has little merit of its own.  The ‘protecting the tradi-
tional family’ argument is at its strongest when it serves as a founda-
tion to another premise, such as procreation, or child rearing.  But 
when it does, then it relies on the validity of the premise it latches on 
to and supports.  
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E.  Promoting the Welfare of Children 
Many states assert being raised in a household by opposite-sex 
parents is in the best interest of the child.331  Some of the cases imply 
traditional families are viewed as stronger than same-sex parented 
families.332  Indeed, some states have even adopted the more rigid view 
that being raised by same-sex parents is either damaging to, or not in 
the best interest of, the child, or both.333  As we have seen, some states 
openly promote the “welfare of children” issue as one related to mor-
al judgment.  Others believe that being raised by same-sex parents 
simply does not provide an optimal environment for the child.  The 
relevant question, then, is whether there are any factors that distin-
guish same-sex couples from opposite-sex couples.  If so, do these dif-
ferences affect the welfare and stability of children raised by same-sex 
parents? 
1. Longitudinal study of opposite-sex and same-sex couples
 
One twelve-year longitudinal study asked whether opposite-sex 
couples and same-sex couples are different in their relationship func-
tioning.334  The purpose of the study was to look at the same-sex mar-
riage controversy from an empirical perspective.335  The study eva-
luated five areas of relationship functioning including: psychological 
adjustment, personality traits, relationship styles, conflict resolution, 
and social support.336  These are discussed below.  
It should be noted that the author of the study makes no claims 
to the sample being representative, and acknowledges that same-sex 
couples with children were not studied, the study was open to the bi-
ases associated with self-reporting by participants, and that the 
couples from each group were not demographically matched.337  The 
issues addressed in this comparative longitudinal study have seldom 
been addressed, even in married heterosexual couples.338 
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The first domain studied was Psychological Adjustment.339  The 
measures used tested for “global severity of distress and life satisfac-
tion,” taking into account multiple factors such as somatic complaints, 
obsessions/compulsions, interpersonal sensitivity, depression, and an-
xiety.340  Partners from same-sex couples did not differ from their op-
posite-sex counterparts in terms of psychological adjustment.  Kurdek, 
the author of the study, noted that this seemed inconsistent with find-
ings by other scholars that gay men and lesbians report more psycho-
logical adjustment problems than heterosexual couples.341  It has been 
speculated by other researchers that the difference in psychological 
distress is likely the result of the “stigma, prejudice, and discrimination 
associated with homosexuality [which] creates a stressful social envi-
ronment.”342  Kurdek concludes that since being a member of a couple 
provides a psychological health advantage, it is plausible that the gay 
men and lesbians studied did not show a differential because they 
were coupled gay men and lesbians.343  Alternatively, Kurdek posits 
that aspects of couplehood, such as the social support received from 
the partner and other same-sex couples, can act as a shield from the 
“negative effects of minority stress” for same-sex couples.344 
The second domain studied was Personality Traits.345  Kurdek stu-
died five traits: neuroticism, extraversion, openness, agreeableness, 
and conscientiousness.346  Neuroticism represented how the person re-
sponds to psychological distress, their level of inability to control 
urges, how prone they are to unrealistic ideas, and their level of inabil-
ity to cope with stress.347  There was no significant difference between 
the same-sex and heterosexual couples in regards to neuroticism.348  
Extraversion looked to the disposition of the person toward positive 
emotions, their sociability, high activity, agency, and self-efficacy.349  
Here, lesbians were slightly more extroverted than the heterosexual 
women.  Kurdek attributed this to the difference in personality traits 
differential that are inherent between lesbians and heterosexual 
women.350  For example, the lesbian identifies with more masculine 
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attributes, being more tomboyish, where the heterosexual counterpart 
may have more feminine qualities.351  Openness represented inclination 
toward variety, intellectual curiosity, and aesthetic (physical appear-
ance) sensitivity.352  Gay men and lesbians had higher scores than their 
heterosexual counterparts.353  Kurdek posits that this may be due to the 
same-sex couples’ need to explore ways to define roles in their rela-
tionships independent of biological gender, which generally defines 
roles in heterosexual relationships.354  Agreeableness represented “an 
inclination toward interpersonal trust and consideration of others,” 
and Conscientiousness represented a “tendency toward persistence, 
industriousness, and organization.”355  Partners from same-sex couples 
did not differ from their heterosexual counterparts in either Agreea-
bleness or Conscientiousness.356  Kurdek notes that having higher levels 
of extraversion and openness does not make same-sex couples partic-
ularly susceptible to relationship distress.357 
The third domain studied was Relationship Styles.358  This meas-
ured levels of intimacy, autonomy, and equality within the relation-
ship.359  Same-sex partners had higher levels of autonomy and equali-
ty.360  This means that same-sex partners had more positive working 
models for their relationships than heterosexual couples.361  Kurdek 
believes this could be attributed to the fact that the same-sex couples 
did not live with children.362  Consistent with this theory is that the he-
terosexual couples who did not have children reported higher levels of 
autonomy and equality as well.363  This may support the theory that 
parenting stress can “spill over into marital stress.”364 
A fourth domain studied was Conflict Resolution.365  This assessed 
the level of ineffectiveness in arguing communication patterns.  In 
studying arguing, Kurdek concluded that the same-sex partners had 
less “demand and withdraw” type arguments – where the arguments 
are left unresolved – and more symmetrical arguments that use posi-
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tive communication.366  The findings indicate that same-sex couples are 
better at conflict resolution than their heterosexual counterpart.367  
Same-sex partners are also more likely to present and receive infor-
mation in a positive manner.368  Kurdek notes, however, that hetero-
sexual non-parents use the demand and withdraw method of conflict 
resolution less frequently than heterosexual parents did, indicating 
that the parenting stressor may translate into marital stressors for he-
terosexual parents.369   
The fifth domain studied was Social Support.370  This rated the 
participants’ overall satisfaction with perceived social supports, per-
ceived support from their relationship, and other supports such as 
family and friends.371  Same-sex couples perceived less family support 
from both their own family and their partner’s family for their rela-
tionships than their heterosexual counterparts.372  However, lesbian 
partners perceived more support from their relationship and their 
own friends than their heterosexual counterparts.  There was no signif-
icant differential between parent and non-parent heterosexual couples 
on any of the social support variables.373  Kurdek found that lesbians’ 
finding more support from their friends and relationships is consistent 
with previous studies that women are socialized to prize their connec-
tions with others.374  Problems with social support from family mem-
bers are especially salient for same-sex couples.375 
In sum, in the first four of these five domains, no significant dif-
ferences were found.376  The only domain that showed somewhat signif-
icant variance was the ‘social support’ domain.377  This differential was 
based on the fact that same-sex couples received less support from 
their family for their relationship than opposite-sex couples did.378  It 
was concluded that “the processes that regulate relationships func-
tioning generalize across gay, lesbian, and heterosexual couples.”379  
The rate of decline in quality was higher for opposite-sex couples in 
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the study, but the factors leading to dissolution of the relationship 
were similar for both opposite-sex and same-sex couples.380  The same-
sex couples functioned slightly better than their opposite-sex counter-
parts overall.381 An analysis of the differentials between same-sex 
couples and non-parent heterosexual couples show similar coping pat-
terns and relationship styles, however, leaving no significant differen-
tial in any of the categories except social support from family.  This is 
an area of support that, arguably, is likely to resolve itself if same-sex 
marriages were to be legalized, thereby reducing the social stigma of 
being in a same-sex relationship.   
The author of the longitudinal study concluded, “the findings re-
ported here can be taken as a basis for claiming that gay men and les-
bians are entitled to legal recognition of their relationship not only 
because, as gay and lesbian citizens, they deserve the same rights and 
privileges as heterosexual citizens, but also because the processes that 
regulate their relationships are the same as those that regulate the 
relationships of [opposite-sex] partners.”382  The indicators are that 
same-sex couples are as able to parent children properly and provide 
for their welfare as opposite-sex couples.  The issue would not lie on 
the same-sex couple’s ability to parent, based on this study, but on the 
effect it would have on a child to be parented by a same-sex couple. 
2. Same-sex parents and child welfare 
A 1992 survey analyzed the available sources on gay men and 
lesbian parented families concluded that “[t]here is no evidence to 
suggest that psychological development among children of gay men or 
lesbians is compromised in any respect relative to that among 
offsprings of heterosexual parents . . . .  Not a single study has found 
children of gay and lesbian parents to be disadvantaged in any signifi-
cant respect.”383   
Studies have shown that same-sex parents are often perceived as 
more emotionally unstable and are often perceived as more likely to 
foster a dangerous environment for children.384  But these fears are not 
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substantiated by evidence.385  Studies do not support the conclusion 
that being raised by same-sex couples is detrimental to children.386   
The dissenting literature on the issue “seems limited to the ob-
servation that some daughters of lesbian couples are more likely to 
engage in activities typically thought of as male, and vice versa for 
sons of such couples.”387  While this shows that children may pick up 
attributes of their same-sex parents (i.e. girls having a tendency to-
ward masculine attributes and boys having a tendency toward femi-
nine attributes when raised by their gay mother), it does not show that 
this is damaging to the welfare of these children.  A strong showing 
that same-sex marriage harms children has not yet been demonstrat-
ed.388  In further support of the premise that being raised by same-sex 
parents is not harmful to children, a 1992 survey of thirty-five studies 
addressing homosexual parents showed that the parents’ sexual orien-
tation did not have any harmful effect on the welfare of their child-
ren.389 
In contrast, Hayton, a family counselor, argues that homosexual 
relationships are abnormal and unstable and harm the stability of the 
traditional family.390  He posits that “homosexuals do not reproduce 
their lifestyle by having children, but by converting heterosexuals and 
youth to become homosexual.”391  He further states that homosexual 
promiscuity acts as a model for children in immoral behavior that 
“every culture around the world throughout all of history has pu-
nished either civilly or criminally.”392  Hayton makes very broad state-
ments in his piece that reflect harsh attitudes toward same-sex 
couples.  His allegations can hardly be taken seriously when he fails to 
validate any of his harsh propositions with a scholarly source cited in 
support.393  Hayton’s unfounded conservative approach is explained in 
                                                                                                                           
 385 Id. 
 386 Culhane, supra note 236, at 1197 (referencing Charlotte Patterson, Children of Lesbian 
and Gay Parents: Summary of Research Findings, in LESBIAN AND GAY PARENTING: A 
RESOURCE FOR PSYCHOLOGISTS (1995), reprinted in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON 
(Andrew Sullivan ed., 1997)). 
 387 Culhane, supra note 236, at 1197 (referencing Philip A. Belcastro et al., A Review of 
Data Based Studies Addressing the Effects of Homosexual Parenting on Children’s Sexual and 
Social Functioning, 20 J. DIVORCE AND REMARRIAGE 105 (1993)). 
 388 Culhane, supra note 236, at 1197.  (Use Id. Citation for this footnote). Culhane also 
notes that in Romer, the state withdrew its argument that “Amendment 2 was somehow justified 
by the need to protect children.  Id. at 1197 n. 366.  
 389 Brent Hartinger, Homosexual Partners are Changing the Family, in FAMILY IN AMERICA: 
OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 25, 55-62, 58 (David L. Bender & Bruno Leone eds., 1992). 
 390 Id. at 63.  
 391 Id. at 65. 
 392 Id. at 66. 
 393 See generally, id. at 63-70 (noting that not one source is cited within his work). 
2007] The Same-Sex Marriage Prohibition 165 
light of the fact that he was a research analyst for Focus on the Family, 
a Colorado based conservative social policy organization.394   
Studies do show, however, that being raised in a well functioning 
two-parent family is good for children.395  Since the scholarly literature 
shows no support for the contention that being raised by same-sex 
parents harms children, it is quite plausible then that allowing same-
sex couples to marry would benefit the welfare of the children pa-
rented by same-sex couples.  One case exemplifies the proposition 
that being raised by same-sex parents can be a healthier alternative to 
being raised by a heterosexual parent.  Weigand v. Houghton396 stands 
for the premise that child welfare should not be decided based solely 
on sexual orientation. 
Weigand was a child custody case involving a gay father and 
mother, the child living with the mother, and the father seeking custo-
dy.397  The father admitted being gay and being active sexually and was 
denied custody by the lower courts as a result.398  The mother, who had 
custody of the child, lived with her new husband who was a very ab-
usive stepfather often prone to violence toward the child.399  The state 
Supreme Court found that the lower courts’ decision had been based 
more on condemnation of the father’s lifestyle, as a gay person, than 
on the son’s best interest.400   
Reversing the lower court, the state Supreme Court found that 
the decision to leave the child with the mother left the child vulnera-
ble to both psychological and physical harm.401  The Court further 
found that in deciding the custody issue, the lower court – swayed by 
the father’s sexual orientation – had ignored that the stepfather was 
prone to violence, that he was a convicted felon, that he had been ar-
rested for hitting the mother in the face and swelling her eye while the 
child was in the home, that he had knocked out a car window in a 
drunken stupor, that he had threatened to kill the child, and that the 
child had requested to live with his father after calling 911.402   
The states that use ‘promotion of child welfare’ as the basis for 
their prohibition of same-sex marriage also fail to take into account 
the damage that is done to children, who live in same-sex parent fami-
lies or same-sex parented step families, as a result of the secrecy that is 
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often forced upon them because of homophobic stereotypes and pre-
judices toward gay people.403  And, as one scholar points out, “[t]o the 
extent that marriage is regarded as a social and legal institution, con-
ferring the right of marriage to gay men and lesbians might actually 
defend their relationships [and, inherently, protect their children] 
against the stresses that plague any couple in the early critical stages 
of the relationship, stresses that may lead to dissolution.”404   
While there seems to be a consensus that children raised in two-
parent households seem to fare better,405 the evidence does not sup-
port that this would need to be a family of opposite-sex parents. 
F.  Promoting a Political Purpose 
One state, within its case law, claimed “Ensuring Consistency with 
Federal Law and Other States” as a basis.406  This state adopted its ra-
tionale from the Federal Defense of Marriage Act, which provides 
that “No State . . . shall be required to give effect to any public act, 
record or judicial proceeding of any other State . . . respecting a rela-
tionship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage 
under the laws of such other State . . . .”407  
In brief, the argument posits that a prohibition of same-sex mar-
riage is justified to ensure consistency with other states and federal 
laws in order to promote political cohesiveness.  This argument ap-
pears to be circular in reasoning because it seems to rely on its own 
premise to prove itself.  In fact it does not, because it does not rely on 
its own intrastate laws to prove itself but puts forth a valid state inter-
est of seeking to maintain interstate cohesiveness to protect interstate 
political relations.  Since all other states currently prohibit same-sex 
marriage, except for Massachusetts and California, the goal of seeking 
to maintain consistency with other state laws appears to square as a 
valid state purpose. Notably, however, by denying same-sex marriage 
on this basis, states that use this basis inherently fail to square with the 
marriage laws of Massachusetts and California—which seems to 
counter the purpose of promoting political cohesiveness (arguably 
exposing a logical flaw in reasoning).  The flawed nature of this basis 
seems further unveiled when the analysis is taken a step further: what 
if all the states adjusted their laws to prohibit same-sex marriage in 
order to ‘ensure consistency with other states as a basis’?  There 
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would then be no reason to stall the legalization of same-sex marriage 
since the legalization in all states would remove the issue of every 
state needing to square with other state jurisdictions on the issue of 
same-sex marriage.  
In essence, if the only reason for all the states denying same-sex 
marriage were to maintain consistency with other states, then the ar-
gument would be circular reasoning and invalid because it would rely 
on its own premise to sustain itself.  But if only a few states use it, and 
other states prohibit same-sex marriage based on other grounds, then 
the argument gains validity because it no longer relies on its premise 
to sustain itself.  Although, the basis seems flawed at least to the ex-
tent that it fails to promote cohesiveness with the two states that cur-
rently allow same-sex marriage.  At this time, it appears that only one 
state uses this premise to prohibit same-sex marriage.  All other juris-
dictions that prohibit same-sex marriage do so on grounds other than 
political consistency.  Although flawed, this basis appears to have 
some validity for the state that uses it to the degree that it promotes 
political cohesiveness with a majority of the remaining states.  
In sum, there is social science scholarship representing and ar-
guing both sides of the issue.  Of the scholarship reviewed, however, 
the scholarship disfavoring same-sex marriage seemed relatively weak 
and, at times, provided unsupported assumptions.  In contrast, the 
scholarship favoring same-sex marriage advanced stronger rationale 
and better scientific support for its arguments.  
IV. SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
Legislators have made comments that bring into question the ba-
sis for their legislating, or ruling, against same-sex marriage.  In discus-
sion regarding the passage of DOMA, for example, a number of Con-
gressmen made comments that expressly established the basis of their 
vote as being religious.408  
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When legislators are stating an express religious basis for passing 
the Act, it begs the question: Are legislators making a law simply to 
allow states the right not to recognize other states’ same-sex marriag-
es?  Or, are they legislating their religious morality under the guise of 
a secular purpose?   
A.  Edwards v. Aguillard 
The U.S. Supreme Court held in Edwards v. Aguillard, an Estab-
lishment Clause case that dealt with a separation of Church and State 
issue, that “[w]hile the Court is normally deferential to a State's arti-
culation of a secular purpose, it is required that the statement of such 
purpose be sincere and not a sham.”409  Under the standard of the Ed-
wards Court, the sincerity of the stated purpose of federal legislators 
in passing DOMA should be seriously questioned.  
In Edwards, the United States Supreme Court considered an Es-
tablishment Clause argument in a case that challenged the constitu-
tionality of a legislative Act that forbid teaching evolution unless the 
school also taught creationism.410  The challenge was on the basis that 
creationism was a religious driven belief and that the Act was a viola-
tion of the separation of church and state because its primary effect 
was that the government advanced the belief of a particular religion 
by forbidding the teaching of evolution unless the school also taught 
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the religious belief of ‘creationism.’411  The Court, in reviewing the 
state of Louisiana’s secular basis for the Act, acknowledged that it is 
extremely deferential to a state’s secular purpose, but that such a pur-
pose must be sincere and cannot be a “sham.”412  The intent of this rule 
is to ensure that the government does not intentionally endorse a reli-
gion or religious practice by purporting a secular purpose for the legis-
lation while actually passing the legislation for a purpose which en-
dorses a religion or religious practice.413 
On the issue of same-sex marriage, the validity of the federal 
DOMA and of some courts’ rulings against same-sex marriage based 
on reasons other than religion is brought into question on examina-
tion of the statements of so many Congressman that expressly show a 
religious basis for their vote on the Defense of Marriage Act.414  Since 
these legislators are representing the interests of the various states in 
Congress, statements that expressly state a religious ground for voting 
on a law such as DOMA arguably bring into question the validity of 
the states’ alleged secular bases for the ongoing prohibition against 
same-sex marriage.  Given that at least thirty-eight states have fol-
lowed suit and enacted their own defense of marriage laws, the impact 
of DOMA has been widespread.  The domino effect DOMA had on 
states is even more reason why an examination of the basis of the 
DOMA warrants scrutiny.   
In addition, there are inconsistencies in the case law that are sus-
picious and bring the validity some of the state’s alleged bases for de-
nying same-sex marriage into question as well.  Arizona, for example, 
has a case that advances a basis against same-sex marriage that is dif-
ferent from the basis stated in its law.415  Similarly, the following states 
have different cases filed that show different ‘state bases’ from case to 
case for prohibiting same-sex marriage: California, Hawaii, New York, 
and Washington.416  And, in at least three of the jurisdictions, D.C., In-
diana, and New Jersey, the same case shows a different basis for ar-
guing against same-sex marriage in the lower court and the upper 
court.417  The fact that the secular basis for prohibiting same-sex mar-
riage changes from case to case, or from court to court, brings into 
question the validity of the claimed basis for prohibiting same-sex 
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marriage as it gives the appearance that these states are ‘fishing’ for a 
‘winning reason.’ 
Arguably, a valid state basis should stand on its own merit and 
not be subject to change from case to case, or from court to court.  The 
very changing nature of such “state secular bases” brings into question 
the legitimacy of these states’ policy intent in prohibiting same-sex 
marriage.  In light of these legal inconsistencies, and the heavily 
stacked sociological evidence that greatly weaken the validity of the 
bases the states have used to maintain the prohibition of same-sex 
marriage, it would not be unreasonable to suspect that the reasons 
provided by the states to support the prohibition of same-sex mar-
riage are sham.   
In light of these facts, an argument that the true purpose of the 
states’ bases for prohibiting same-sex marriage not only lacks a secu-
lar basis, but also serves to advance the religious beliefs of the moral 
majority can meritoriously be advanced.  This plausible argument 
should not be brushed off lightly.   
B.  Laws Informed by Religious Moral Premises and the Establish- 
ment Clause 
Justice O’Connor has stated, “[i]t is not a trivial matter, however, 
to require that the legislature manifest a secular purpose and omit all 
sectarian endorsements from its laws.”418  But, is a law being informed 
by religious ideology and purposes sufficient to create an Establish-
ment Clause issue?  Must a law be 100% secular to pass muster?  The 
answer is in the negative.  For if laws had to be completely secular to 
pass constitutional muster, then crimes such as murder could not be 
criminally regulated.  The SCOTUS has made clear in more than one 
decision that some religious basis will not invalidate a law.419 
1. The “Purpose” Prong 
Arguing that religiously informed laws do not violate the Estab-
lishment Clause just because they are religiously informed, one scho-
lar points out that the “secular purpose” hurdle of the Lemon test is 
low, and it can be easily satisfied.420  A religious purpose in the law can 
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stand so long as it is neither preeminent nor exclusive.421  The Supreme 
Court has found in the past that a statute may pass the Lemon test so 
long as its purpose is not entirely religious.422  A test requiring the gov-
ernment to have exclusively secular purposes would be over inclusive 
and invalidate much legislation.423   
When addressing the validity of a statute under the Establish-
ment Clause, the analysis begins with a presumption that any given 
law possesses a valid secular purpose.424  The burden is on the challen-
ger of the statute to show that the statute is wholly motivated by reli-
gious considerations.425  In Wallace v. Jaffree, the plaintiff met this bur-
den and a statute that called for a moment of silence in public schools 
was held to violate the Establishment Clause.426  This was because Sen-
ator Holmes expressly stated the religious basis of the statute.
 427  The 
State of Alabama, however, did not put forth any evidence of a secular 
purpose.428  Arguably, based on Lynch, any evidence on the part of the 
state of Alabama that the statute had a “clearly secular purpose”429 and 
was not “motivated wholly by religious considerations” would have 
passed constitutional muster.430  In Wallace, the presumption of consti-
tutionality was not overcome because the State of Alabama failed to 
enumerate a valid secular purpose after the statute’s objective had 
been successfully challenged.  This is because “[o]nly if the challenger 
can meaningfully call into question the statute’s objectives, and only if 
the government cannot then either identify an enumerated secular 
purpose or articulate a secular purpose in litigation, will the presump-
tion of constitutionality be removed.”431   
Unlike the state of Alabama in Wallace, some states declared se-
cular, non-religious purposes, either within their statute or within their 
case law, to support their marriage laws and their prohibition against 
same-sex marriage.432  These declared secular purposes are likely suffi-
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cient to overcome the low hurdle of the purpose prong of Lemon.  It is 
true that when looking at the scholarship that examines the states’ 
bases for prohibiting same-sex marriage, the scholarship against same-
sex marriage seems to have weaker scientific basis for its propositions 
than the scholarship that lends support to the legalization of same-sex 
marriage.  The fact remains, however, that the scholarship is divided.  
In light of this division, the very enumeration of a secular purpose is 
likely to be enough to overcome the low hurdle imposed on the states 
to have a secular purpose.  
The first prong of Lemon, “alternatively formulated . . . also pro-
hibits laws which have the [primary] purpose of advancing or inhibit-
ing religion.”433  In light of the Judeo-Christian history of marriage 
laws, there is little room to argue that the original purpose of the pro-
hibition of same-sex marriage served to advance the Judeo-Christian 
ideal of marriage.  The question, then, is whether the prohibition’s 
original purpose being rooted in religion represents an inherent suc-
cessful challenge to the present-day constitutionality of the prohibi-
tion.  It does not.  “An examination of the case law . . . reveals that [the 
same-sex marriage prohibition’s] original purposes are not necessarily 
dispositive to an assessment of its present day constitutionality.”434  
This is a sensible premise since in the absence of such a rule, arguably 
all marriage laws would be constitutionally void given their Judeo-
Christian roots and heritage.  Indeed, a rule of law once grounded in 
religious premises may become secularized over time.  
Moreover, if a law being rooted in religious morality were to be 
construed as having a purpose to advance religion, an alternative for-
mulation could be argued that a law rooted in secular morality could 
be construed as having a purpose to inhibit religion.435  This argument, 
obviously, is absurd since it would invalidate virtually all laws based 
on an Establishment Clause argument.436  Second, to have such a rule 
would “effectively disenfranchise[] or disable[] the religious voice in 
the public square. . . .  Under such a rule, religious citizens [could] in-
terject their deepest beliefs into the legislative process, but [could not] 
be manifestly successful.”437  This, in essence, would result in the in-
equality of the religious voice in our Democracy; and, a rule that inhi-
bits “participatory equality” stands against established principles of 
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democracy and should be rejected even if it appears to be of “superfi-
cially sound construction.”438 
Voter lobbying and legislative enactment, however, should be dis-
tinguished.  Arguably, passing a law prohibiting same-sex marriage 
because a majority of the state’s constituents petitioned for such a law 
would be a valid secular purpose even if the voter’s desire for the law 
were to promote religious advancement.  However, the State is simply 
serving its constituents in such a case.  Thus, I propose that the state 
constitutional amendments that were passed based on the votes of the 
constituents of the state have a valid secular purpose underlying them, 
since the legislators acted based on the desires of their constituents.  
The opinions of the legislators are no longer at stake, since it is the 
voters who approve constitutional amendments.  Therefore, a constitu-
tional amendment banning same-sex marriage is passed for the pur-
pose of serving the desires of the state’s constituents, rendering what 
the legislators’ actual purpose may have been irrelevant. 
Even if every voter in the state voted based on religious reasons 
to prohibit same-sex marriage, an argument that the legislators ‘con-
structively adopted’ their religious constituents’ religious basis would 
be weak at best because, as previously discussed, it would effectively 
disenfranchise this constituency.  Also, it would hardly be reasonable 
to expect a legislator to poll his constituency for the moral basis of 
their vote.  To trigger an Establishment Clause issue under the pur-
pose prong of Lemon, it would take a legislative enactment that is 
written in such a way as to give the unmistakable impression that a 
specific religious belief drives it.439  
In sum, where states have declared a secular basis for their prohi-
bition either within the statutes or in litigation, a presumption of the 
statute’s constitutionality remains unless the statute’s secular purpose 
is successfully challenged.  While a challenge that the purposes of leg-
islators who expressly declare a religious basis for voting a same-sex 
marriage prohibition law into being would appear as a sham on its 
face – when the declared state purpose differs – it is unlikely that such 
a challenge, although meritorious in its own right, would succeed in 
light of the low hurdle set by the SCOTUS.  “Deference” to the pre-
sumption of validity “ought not be confused with blind reliance,” 
however.440  As such, the “avowed purposes” of laws prohibiting same-
sex marriage, which are voted on based on the legislators’ expressed 
religious grounds or where the state has engaged in a fishing expedi-
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tion from case to case or court to court, should be carefully examined 
“to ensure that the purpose is sincere and not a sham,”441 and that the 
“government's actual purpose is [not] to endorse or disapprove of 
religion.”442 
2. The “effect” prong 
The next prong of the Lemon test, the effect prong, requires that 
the effect of the law neither advances nor inhibits religion.443  This is 
distinguished from the alternative formula of the purpose prong since 
a law that does not have the purpose of advancing or inhibiting reli-
gion could still have the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting reli-
gion.  Under Justice O’Connor’s alternative construction of this Lem-
on prong, however, a statute that has the primary effect of advancing 
or inhibiting religion could still pass muster.444  Justice O’Connor’s 
primary concern is that the government’s practice should not have the 
“effect of communicating a message of government endorsement or 
disapproval of religion.”445  Whether the government practice has the 
effect of communicating government endorsement or disapproval of 
religion is determined on the “basis of judicial interpretation of social 
facts.”446  
Whether Justice O’Connor’s framework increases or lowers the 
bar for this prong could be argued both ways.  Conceivably, a situation 
where the effect is not advancement or inhibition of religion, but 
where the government may present the appearance of endorsing a 
religion is plausible.  For example, imagine a city government in a city 
with a large Orthodox Jewish community.  For this city to close on 
major Jewish holy days would not in effect advance the religion be-
cause Orthodox Jews who are highly observant would take these holy 
days as days off work anyway.  It could, however, give the appearance 
of endorsement by the city government.  In contrast, one could con-
ceive of a situation where the appearance may not be one of govern-
ment endorsement, but the primary effect of the law would be to ad-
vance or inhibit a religion.  As a crude example, imagine the same 
community where a statute is passed that says, “any city employee 
missing more than five days of work per year will be fired.”  Conceiv-
ably, this would not provide the appearance of government favoring 
one religion over another on its face because it applies to all em-
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ployees.  Yet, the primary effect in a city that is, say, ninety-five percent 
Orthodox Jewish, would be the large scale inhibition of the practice of 
that faith of all those who work within that city.  While these examples 
are rather simplistic, they illustrate the point that Justice O’Connor’s 
framework of the effect prong does not, per se, raise or lower the bar 
for that prong.   
As one scholar points out, however, “to the extent that a law does 
derive its moral premises from religious traditions, either directly or as 
reflected in public opinion, one could very well conclude that the gov-
ernment is in a sense endorsing or at least looking favorably upon the 
underlying religious beliefs.”447  Such a position would over broaden 
the reach of the effect prong, however.  This renders the application of 
the proposition impracticable.  Rather, the questions to be asked, in 
the case of same-sex marriage prohibition, are whether the statute 
advances or inhibits religion, and whether a reasonable observer 
would conclude that the government is endorsing or disapproving of 
religion.   
These questions raise a potpourri of arguments because the reli-
gious beliefs held by some are not the religious beliefs held by all.  
There are churches that acknowledge and perform same-sex marriage 
in spite of the fact that they are not legally recognized.  For example, a 
number of Christian denominations, including Metropolitan Commu-
nity Church,448 the United Church of Christ,449 and some Episcopal 
churches450 allow same-sex marriage.  Several Jewish organizations also 
endorse same-sex marriage.451  And other religious organizations, such 
as the Unitarian Universalist Churches, also support same-sex mar-
riage.452  Ultimately, because there are religions that are both for and 
against same-sex marriage, a statute prohibiting same-sex marriages 
would advance the religious interests of some, while inhibiting the 
interests of others.   
One scholar argues that to “trigger the [government] endorse-
ment [of religion] prohibition, a legal enactment probably has to be 
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written in such a way as to give the unmistakable impression that a 
specific religious belief, let alone a specific practice or denominational 
position, constituted the very essence of the enactment.”453  I would 
argue, however, that in light of the numerous religiously based state-
ments against same-sex marriage made by legislators and judges, ad-
vancing an argument that a reasonable observer would see a prohibi-
tion of same-sex marriage as government endorsement of some reli-
gions would be reasonable, even if it is not written. 
Granted, the religious statements I enumerated in this paper are 
primarily those of Senators and Representatives in the passage of 
DOMA.  However, this is significant in light of the fact that the feder-
al Defense of Marriage Act was the catalyst for the many states that 
followed suit and passed their own laws prohibiting same-sex mar-
riage.  Unless there were statements rooted in religious premises that 
established a vote based on religious purposes within each respective 
state, however, this argument would likely not fly because the voice of 
the federal legislators in passing DOMA (a federal Act) could not, 
based on notions of state supremacy, be the basis upon which to ques-
tion and evaluate the effect of the actions of state legislators. 
3. The excessive entanglement prong 
Under this prong, a law “violate[s] the Establishment Clause if it 
fosters an excessive entanglement of government and religion.”454  
There are different types of entanglements.  In doctrinal entangle-
ment, the government decides issues of religious doctrine or ecclesias-
tical law.455  While in political entanglements, the government grants 
civil power to religious institutions or authorities.456  The religious mo-
tivations of legislators, in passing a law prohibiting same-sex marriage, 
is significant to the issue of doctrinal entanglement.457   
There are two issues implicated in doctrinal entanglement: “first, 
the degree to which the legislature translates the religious sources in 
the process of deriving statutory premises, and second, the degree to 
which legislature necessarily or actually relies upon these premises.”458  
It is more likely that a court would find an entanglement issue where 
there is little translation of religious sources and there is greater actual 
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reliance on religious premises.459  In addition, even if the court were to 
find there was an entanglement, the court would then have to find that 
the entanglement is constitutionally excessive.460  Therefore, the analy-
sis is a question of degree that “depends on all the circumstances of a 
particular relationship.”461  Absent evidence that a majority of the leg-
islative votes on a law prohibiting same-sex marriage were religiously 
based, however, and in light of the fact that to date courts have found 
valid secular bases for prohibiting same-sex marriage, it is unlikely 
that a court would weigh the analysis in favor of finding an entangle-
ment issue.462 
In sum, plausible and meritorious arguments could certainly be 
advanced that an Establishment Clause issue does in fact exist.  How-
ever, whether the argument would succeed doctrinally under current 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is another story.  Whether based 
on their complexity or on the legal sufficiency of the merits, the judi-
ciary has largely declined to take on and decide these issues.463 
C.  Religious and Secular Morality – Can They Be Separated? 
Michael Perry, a constitutional scholar, has written much on the 
issue of morality, religion, and the law.464  Perry posits, in regards to the 
same-sex marriage issue, that the Establishment Clause “does not 
stand in the way of . . . legislators or other policymakers banning or 
otherwise disfavoring conduct on the basis of a religiously grounded 
belief that the conduct is immoral, even if it lacks plausible, indepen-
dent secular grounding.”465  Perry believes that the SCOTUS Justices 
are so divided in regards to the application of Establishment Clause 
perimeters that a firm “nonestablishment norm” does not exist.466  The 
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essence of this posture rests on the difficulty of separating religious 
morality from secular morality.467  This is because for every moral norm 
that can be legislated, the grounds for support of such legislation 
would be inherently religious for some, while non-religious for oth-
ers.468  This is inevitable.  A good example of this is a law that crimina-
lizes murder.  Many will believe such a law is necessary because mur-
der is against the Ten Commandments.  However, many would also 
support it just because they feel murder is wrong, independent of any 
religious ground for their belief.  Perry, then, goes beyond McGowan – 
which said that a law would not be invalidated simply because it har-
monizes with religious tenets469 and points to a deeper issue, which is 
the difficulty that presents itself when one tries to separate religious 
and political morality. 
Given the inherent mixing of religious and nonreligious premises 
for legislating virtually any given moral thing, to have to separate a 
religious from a non-religious premise is problematic.470  And, enforc-
ing a policy that would call for the separation of religious and secular 
morality also raises concerns of reasonable uniformity between the 
states.471  For example, one state could strike down as unconstitutional 
a law prohibiting same-sex marriage because the court finds that the 
legislators voted in the law based on religious moral convictions.  
While another state, with a virtually verbatim worded law could main-
tain it if the court found that the legislators did not vote based on reli-
gious moral convictions, but rather on a personal belief that such mar-
riages do not serve the interests of the state.472 
What is morally permissible and what is legally permissible are 
often at odds with each other.473  While not everyone who believes that 
something is immoral will inherently want the conduct banned, the 
fact that something is immoral is often at the center of controversy 
when a group seeks to get conduct legally banned.474  As Perry points 
out, morality may have different points of origin: some may ground 
their morality on religious premises, for example, while others who do 
not believe in God do believe in, and live by, secular moral stan-
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dards,475 perhaps relying on such things as their conscience to guide 
their personal sense of right and wrong. 
Perry posits that there are three bases for moral argument.  First, 
moral argument is used to dictate which person we should care about.  
Second, moral argument is used to dictate what is good and what is 
bad for those whom we should care about.  And third, moral argument 
is used to determine how we should resolve conflicts when what is 
good for one person we care about conflicts with what is good for 
another person we care about.476  Perry states that these are not reli-
gious premises but simply moral premises.477   
However, for the religious moralists (those whose moral fiber is 
grounded in religiously driven beliefs), no answer to these questions 
would be plausible unless it were religiously grounded.478  Thus, Perry 
believes that for some, religious faith and fundamental moral judg-
ments are inextricably connected.479  And, he implies that in a society 
where 95% believe in God and 70% attend church or synagogue, a 
separation of religious and secular morality is implausible.480  Based on 
this, Perry does not believe that the Establishment Clause stands in 
the way of citizens, legislators, or other policymakers disfavoring con-
duct on the grounds that they believe the conduct is immoral, even if 
the beliefs that the conduct is immoral lacks plausible, independent 
secular grounding.481 
Applying Perry’s notion of the religious moralist to the tradition-
al historical Judeo-Christian position on same-sex marriage, then, it 
goes like this: The Bible says that same-gendered people should not 
marry, and the Bible can never be wrong, therefore anyone who says 
marriage between same-gendered people is allowable takes an erro-
neous and heretical position.482  The problem with the formulation, 
however, is that not all religious people share the same moral convic-
tions.  Recognizing this, Perry admits that while he believes the Bible 
to be an absolute source of truth, it may well be open to interpretation 
since its words may at times be abstruse and may ‘say’ things that are 
quite different from its literal text.483  Based on this, he puts forth an 
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argument that calls for political self-restraint, arguing that “Christians, 
in deciding whether to favor or disfavor same-sex unions, have good 
reason to forswear reliance on the biblically grounded belief that ho-
mosexual conduct is always immoral.”484 
Perry also believes that it would be implausible for a loving God 
to create in a human being a nature that allows the occurrence of 
deeply fulfilling same-sex relationships only to bar such people from 
ever entering into such a relationship.485  Thus, Perry recognizes that 
while many Christians believe that same-sex sexual relationships are 
always sinful based on the text of the Bible (namely Genesis 19:1-29, 
Leviticus 18:22 & 20:13, Romans 1:18-32, 1 Corinthians 6:9, and 1 Ti-
mothy 1:10), others believe that proper interpretation of the Bible 
does not teach that it is always immoral to engage in same-sex sexual 
relationships.486  Thus, there are many competing scriptural arguments 
on the polar positions on the issue of Christian morality and same-sex 
relationships. 
In sum, Perry does not believe that the Establishment Clause 
should forbid policymaking based on religious grounds because our 
society is predominantly a religion-based community, and for many in 
the religious community, religious faith and fundamental morality are 
inextricably woven, preventing a separation of religious and secular 
morality.  But, Perry does recognize that there are philosophical dif-
ferences between religious faiths and interpretative differences within 
the same faiths.  Based on these recognized differences, he advocates 
that religious people should consider basing their position on grounds 
other than their religious morality. 
I respectfully disagree with these propositions for two reasons.  
First, it seems that asking religious fundamentalists to practice politi-
cal self-restraint is like pleading for them to do something which they 
are inherently unable to do.  If in fact their faith were inextricably wo-
ven into their religious morality, they would have to act against their 
very moral fiber to practice political tolerance.  This would mean that 
they would have to vote in a way that would allow conduct they be-
lieve to be inherently harmful.  The likelihood that widespread self-
restraint would take place is tenuous at best.  And second, absent 
widespread self-restraint, the essence of the proposition Perry puts 
forth serves to allow the will of the religious moral majority to be 
forced upon the moral minority, unless the moral minority’s position 
happens to coincide with that of the majority. 
                                                                                                                           
 484 Id. at 449. 
 485 Id. at 454-55. 
 486 Id. at 456. 
2007] The Same-Sex Marriage Prohibition 181 
I do not believe the solution lies in abandoning the constitutional 
protection intended by the enactment of the first amendment simply 
because the issue of same-sex marriage is a difficult one to sort, or 
because, arguably, religious morality and secular morality cannot be 
easily separated. 
V.  IS THERE A SOLUTION? 
One could argue that maintaining the traditional institution of 
marriage to be between one man and one woman does not discrimi-
nate against gays because gay people could choose to marry a person 
of the opposite sex, availing themselves of all the benefits of ‘tradi-
tional marriage.’  This, of course, presumes that gay people have a 
choice in their sexual orientation.  This is a very heterosexually based 
premise that is no more logical to many gay people than to say that 
one can choose one’s race, or that heterosexual people have a choice 
in their inherent attraction to the opposite sex.  This belief – that a gay 
person has a choice in their sexual orientation – is also at the very 
root of the religious belief that same-sex sexual practices are immoral 
and that same-sex sexual orientation can be changed.   
Arguably, whether homosexuality is a choice should not even be 
at the heart of the debate.  Why would the notion of choice have any-
thing to do with whether same-sex marriage should be legalized?  The 
very notion of arguing choice when addressing legalization of same-
sex marriage only serves to lay the foundation for a morality argu-
ment, implying that choosing to be homosexual would be a less moral 
choice than choosing not to be.  However, the fact that something is 
considered immoral by religious institutions should not, under a Con-
stitution that advocates the separation of Church and State, drive the 
law.  While some areas of secular morality inevitably will intersect 
with religious morality, such as in the case of murder, there are areas 
that clearly do not, and should not, intersect.  One example is that leg-
islatures do not impose sanctions for cursing with God’s name.  As a 
matter of fact, such expression would arguably be protected as free 
speech. 
In his Lawrence dissent,487 Justice Scalia openly admitted that the 
majority failed to take into account that “[m]any Americans do not 
want persons who . . . engage in homosexual conduct as partners in 
their business, as scoutmasters for their children, as teachers in their 
children’s schools, or as boarders in their home.”488  While accusing the 
Supreme Court of taking sides in a “culture war,” Justice Scalia goes 
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on to recognize that these people see holding gays at a distance as 
necessary for the protection of themselves and their families.489  Justice 
Scalia’s assertions are not only quite perplexing, but border on outra-
geous given the fact that, after all, there was a time in the not so dis-
tant past when white people did not want black persons as partners in 
their business, as scoutmasters for their children, as teachers in their 
children’s schools, and as boarders in their homes.  And, those people 
also saw holding at a distance the black person as necessary for the 
protection of themselves and their families.  Just as these are not 
proper basis for segregation, neither should they be proper basis for 
prohibiting same-sex marriage—‘marriage’ being a legal right that 
grants legal benefits touching virtually every area of one’s life includ-
ing wills and trusts to property, contracts, survivorship benefits, health 
insurance benefits, and more.  The rights of a group should not be im-
peded based on the fears or prejudices of the majority. 
If same-sex marriage had been prohibited absent the religiously 
based comments of legislators and judges when passing and ruling on 
laws prohibiting same-sex marriage, the Establishment Clause issue 
would be much weaker.  But, as previously discussed, legislators have 
passed legislation based on expressly declared religious ideology and 
beliefs.  And, judges have ruled in cases involving same-sex couples 
based on religious ideology and belief.  It is these many religious 
comments, coupled with the fact that a number of states have gone on 
‘fishing expeditions’ looking for the secular purpose that would stick 
in court from case to case, or from court to court, that raises a valid 
flag of suspicion as to the validity of the states’ claimed secular pur-
poses.  And, where the social science scholarship in support of the 
prohibition appears relatively weak scientifically in contrast with the 
scholarship that supports same-sex marriage, the proposition that the 
states currently base their prohibition on valid secular purposes is 
even more diminished.  
Perry suggests a very valid point throughout his essays on morali-
ty, however.  Namely that it is highly unlikely that a separation of reli-
gious morality and secular morality at the individual level could be 
accomplished because the moral fiber of religious moralists tends to 
be so inextricably woven into their religious beliefs.  What I propose is 
that a separation of religious and secular morality be accomplished at 
the government level.  In his Gettysburg address, Abraham Lincoln 
referred to our government, as being a “government of the people, by 
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the people, for the people."490  Government, then, should separate no-
tions of religious morality and secular morality to serve the interests 
of all of its people, where this is possible.   
While the religious voice cannot constitutionally control law 
making, neither should the religious voice be so completely ignored 
that it loses representation in the public square, however.  It must be 
remembered that while the government must preserve civil liberties 
from religious interference, it must also preserve religious liberty from 
civil interference.491  Thus, a balance has to be achieved that neither 
advances nor inhibits religious interests, or impedes civil liberties.  
I propose that a viable, if not the best, solution that can achieve 
this balance is a total separation of Church and State, insofar as mar-
riage is concerned, accomplished by separating the institution of civil 
marriage from the institution of religious marriage.  Such a separation, 
done properly, would protect the rights of same-sex couples, while at 
the same time protecting the religious interests of those institutions 
that are against same-sex marriage.  Can this be done effectively?  We 
need only look to our northern neighbor, Canada, to answer this ques-
tion.   
In Canada, historically, marriage had been defined as the “union 
of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others” through the 
common law, with Quebec eventually including this common law defi-
nition within their code.492  It has been settled law for some time, how-
ever, that exclusive jurisdiction to regulate who has the capacity to 
enter into marriage belonged to the Canadian Parliament, while the 
provinces regulate the formalities of marriage.493   
Just as the issue discussed in this paper is about Constitutional 
Rights under the Establishment Clause, similarly the Prime Minister 
of Canada recognized that the “vote [on same-sex marriage in Cana-
da] is about the Charter of Rights.”494  And, just as the United States is 
a nation of minorities, the United States government should recognize, 
as Canada’s Prime Minister did, that we too are “a nation of minori-
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ties and in a nation of minorities you don’t cherry-pick rights.”495  The 
result in Canada was the passing of Federal Bill C-38,496 which says that 
“Marriage, for civil purposes, is the lawful union of two persons to the 
exclusion of all others.”497  Bill C-38 is titled “The Civil Marriage 
Act.”498   
The Act effectively separated the institutions of Civil and Reli-
gious Marriage through Clause 3.1 of Bill C-38.499  Clause 3.1 recog-
nized that religious officials could refuse to perform marriages that 
are at odds with their religious beliefs and provided that the practice 
of their religious faith, in so refusing, would be protected from penalty 
when it stated that: 
no person or organization shall be deprived of any bene-
fit, or be subject to any obligation or sanction, under any 
law of the Parliament of Canada solely by reason of their 
exercise, in respect of marriage between persons of the 
same-sex, of the freedom of conscience and religion 
guaranteed under the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms or the expression of their beliefs in respect of 
marriage as the union of a man and a woman to the ex-
clusion of all others based on that guaranteed freedom.500   
Through the passing of Bill C-38, then, Canada reached a position 
that neither deprived the rights of the minority voice based on the 
religious moral majority, nor deprived the religious moral majority of 
their freedom to freely exercise their religion.   
The United States, however, could not pass such legislation at the 
federal level because it is not within its enumerated constitutional 
powers to regulate marriage.501  Thus, since the power is “not delegated 
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the 
States, [it is] reserved to the States respectively.”502  So, for such legisla-
tion to take place in the United States, either the states would have to 
enact the legislation within their respective jurisdictions or it would 
have to pass by amendment to the federal Constitution. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
A separation of the definitions of civil and religious marriage 
would effectively resolve the Establishment Clause issue that current-
ly exists.  It would provide same-sex couples with equal access to hun-
dreds of government protections that come with marriage, in areas 
ranging from taxes, to property ownership, to the right to make medi-
cal decisions for – and inherit from – one’s spouse under the law.  That 
this would harm the institution of marriage is unlikely.  As one lawyer 
practitioner put it: 
[T]he idealized and fictional marriage that the opposition 
is fighting so hard to protect simply does not exist.  Make 
no mistake about it, civil marriage is available to anyone 
over the age of eighteen who passes a syphilis test and is 
marrying someone of the opposite sex – that’s it!  The 
marriage that the opposition is protecting and all of this 
discussion about children, love, devotion, procreation, 
and exalted relationship in every way; it is not required 
by any state statute.  To get a marriage license, one must 
be eighteen years old – that's all!  You do not have to 
prove that you are fertile; you do not have to prove that 
you are able to have children; you do not have to prove 
that you are not getting married just for the health insur-
ance or the tax benefits; and, you do not automatically 
lose your license if you fail to produce children or stop 
loving each other.  Just as importantly, the state does not 
step in to remove your children if you are a single parent 
or divorced or force you to be sterilized if you are dis-
abled or impaired.  Under the law, two people can marry 
for any reason at all, so long as they are of the opposite 
sex, or for no reason at all, or for any reason that many 
people would believe are bad reasons.  But the important 
point here is that the state does not ask.  Your church 
may ask, your family may ask, your friends may ask, but 
not the government.  And this is all gay people are asking 
for; the right to marry without these questions being 
asked of them.503 
Some may argue that the marriage they are seeking to protect is a 
myth because marriage has evolved, divorce rates have gone up, there 
are no requirements to prove ability to procreate, the family has 
                                                                                                                           
 503 Gretchen Van Ness, The Inevitability of Gay Marriage, 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 563, 566 
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evolved into more non-traditional forms of ‘family’, etc.  The flip side 
of the argument, however, is that the many changes marriage has suf-
fered are exactly the reasons why such protection of traditional mar-
riage is warranted.  The issues are so complex, and so two-sided, that 
sorting them out on the merits of an Establishment Clause argument 
would arguably inherently create either a purpose, effect, or entangle-
ment issue for one side or the other of the argument under Lemon.  
However, in light of all the social science scholarship that sup-
ports same-sex couples’ ability to procreate through alternative 
means, that same-sex couples – like their heterosexual counterparts – 
also desire to have children and raise families, that same-sex couples 
are as stable in all major areas of functioning as their heterosexual 
counterparts, that not only is the welfare of same-sex parented child-
ren not adversely affected – but that denying equal status to these 
parents may in fact promote a prejudice that fosters secretiveness – 
which does harm children, a separation of civil and religious marriage 
appears to be a viable option.  Not only is it a viable option, but also 
one that would not adversely affect states’ alleged interests in mar-
riage, while at the same time resolving all Establishment Clause issues. 
A separation of civil and religious marriage would allow equal 
access to marriage to all people, while not forcing religious institutions 
to recognize these marriages.  It would effectively remove any gov-
ernment entanglement from the institution of marriage and neither 
advance nor inhibit any given religion because religious institutions 
could still chose to refuse to perform same-sex marriages.   
We cannot change the history of our laws.  However, while the 
spirit of the common law upon which our laws are founded advocates 
that “[w]e are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Su-
preme Being,” Justice Douglas, however, notably adds that “if and 
when God is going to be served, [it] will not be motivated by coercive 
measures of government.”504 
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